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REIMBURSEMENT TO PARENTS OF
TUITION AND OTHER COSTS UNDER THE
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES
EDUCATION IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 2004
LEWIS M. WASSERMAN*
INTRODUCTION
A substantial number of judicial decisions involve parents of
disabled children who are dissatisfied with the programs and/or
services offered to their child by public agencies. These parents
opt to enroll their child in programs and/or services they deem
appropriate to meet their child's special needs and then seek
reimbursement for the associated expenses under the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004
(hereinafter "IDEA/2004").I These programs and services
typically include private school programs, tutoring,
supplementary services and independent medical or other
professional evaluations of their child for the purpose of
ascertaining their special needs. At times, although satisfied
with the Individualized Education Program (hereinafter "IEP")
their school district created for their child, parents purchase
special education or related services and then seek
reimbursement for such expenses, contending that the school
district did not implement the IEP as required. However,
parents are not always successful in obtaining reimbursement.
Founding Partner, Wasserman Steen, LLP, Patchogue, New York. Mr. Wasserman holds a Juris
Doctor from St. John's University School of Law and a Ph.D. in School Psychology from Hofstra
University, and currently practices in the fields of education and employment discrimination law.
I See Shaffer v. Weast, 126 S.Ct. 528, 533 (2005) (concerning the educational services that were
due to a child suffering from learning disabilities and speech-language impairments); see also Deptford
Township Sch. Dist. v. H.B., No. 01-0784(JBS), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11602, at * 2-4 (D.N.J. June
15, 2005) (discussing the case of an autistic child whose parents, dissatisfied with their public education
plan, sought recourse under IDEA/2004).
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This article examines the elements for reimbursement under
IDEA/2004,2 namely denial of a free appropriate public
education for the child and the appropriateness of the
programs/services purchased by the parents, through judicial
decisions rendered under IDEA/2004's predecessor statutes 3 to
reimbursement claims under IDEA/2004. The article will also
examine complete and partial defenses to reimbursement claims
under IDEA/2004 based on, among other things, parental
conduct, program/services cost, and statutes of limitation.
Finally, the article will synthesize the current statutory scheme
with case law to render practical advice regarding the
prosecution of complaints seeking reimbursement under
IDEA/2004 and make suggestions for further amendment to
IDEA which may be helpful in attaining the Congressional goal
that all children with disabilities receive a free appropriate
education which meets their special needs.
I. OVERVIEW OF IDEA/2004
IDEA/2004 provides federal money to assist state ("SEAs")
and local education agencies ("LEAs") in educating children with
disabilities and conditions such funding upon the state's
compliance with extensive goals and procedures.4 The Act
requires states to provide disabled children with a "free
2 Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118
Stat. 2647 (2004) (codified as 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2006)). The IDEA sections are as follows: Part
A-General Provisions, Sections 601-610; Part B- Assistance for Education of All Children with
Disabilities, Sections 611-619; Part C-Infants and Toddlers with Disabilities, Sections 631-644; Part D-
National Activities to Improve Education for Children with Disabilities, Sections 650-682. Id.
3 See Education of the Handicapped Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-230, § 701-716, 84 Stat. 121(1970) (defining the original Education of the Handicapped Act passed in 1970); see also Education for
all Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (amending the original
Education of the Handicapped Act and renaming the act, Education for All Handicapped Children Act
of 1975, "EHA"); Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-
17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997) (adding new amendments to the Act); Education of the Handicapped Act
Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 191-476, 104 Stat. 1103 (1990) (renaming the act, Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, without substantial alteration in its content and continuing the theme from
the prior acts of providing financial support to state and local educational agencies for the education of
children with disabilities in the nation's public schools, but abrogating states' 11' h Amendment
immunity under the Act).
4 IDEA/2004 is interpreted under standards established for legislation passed under Congress's
spending power. See Schaffer, 126 S.Ct. at 531. Because the power to legislate under the spending
Clause rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the contract, those
conditions Congress intends to impose on the funding recipient must be expressed unambiguously.
See Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester County, et al. v. Rowley, 458
U.S. 176, 204 (1982).
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appropriate public education" ("FAPE")5 that includes "special
education 6 and related services."7 IDEAI2004 recognizes thirteen
categories of disability8 plus at the discretion of the states, one
additional category of disability. 9
To be eligible for special education and related services under
IDEAI2004 a student must be between the ages of three and
5 See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (2006) defining FAPE as:
special education and related services that (A) have been provided at public expense, under public
supervision and direction, and without charge; (B) meet the standards of the State educational
agency; (C) include appropriate preschool, elementary school, or secondary school education in
the State involved; and (D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program
required under section 614(d).
6 See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(29) (2006) (defining "[sipecial education" as "specially designed
instruction, at no cost to the parents, to meet the unique needs of a child with a disability, including - -
(A) instruction conducted in the classroom, in the home, in hospitals and institutions, and in other
settings; and (B) instruction in physical education"); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.26(2) (1999) (indicating
that special education includes: "(i) Speech-language pathology services, or any other related service, if
the service is considered special education rather than a related service under State standards; (ii) Travel
training; and (iii) Vocational education"); 34 C.F.R. § 300.26(3) (1999) (explaining how "[s]pecially
designed instruction means adapting, as appropriate to the needs of an eligible child.. .the content,
methodology, or delivery of instruction - - (i) To address the unique needs of the child that result from
the child's disability; and (ii) To ensure access of the child to the general curriculum, so that he or she
can meet the educational standards within the jurisdiction of the public agency that apply to all
children").
7 [R]elated services means transportation and such developmental, corrective, and other
supportive services as are required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special
education, and includes speech-language pathology and audiology services, psychological
services, physical and occupational therapy, recreation, including therapeutic recreation, early
identification and assessment of disabilities in children, counseling services, including
rehabilitation counseling, orientation and mobility services, and medical services for
diagnostic or evaluation purposes. The term also includes school health services, social work
services in schools, and parent counseling and training.
34 C.F.R. § 300.24(a) (1999).
8 See 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (2006) (enumerating the disabilities recognized under IDEA/2004
including "mental retardation, hearing impairments (including deafness), speech or language
impairments, visual impairments (including blindness), serious emotional disturbance (referred to in
this title as 'emotional disturbance'), orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other
health impairments, or specific learning disabilities"); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.7 (1999) (recognizing
the same disabilities as IDEA/2004 and describing the term "multiple disabilities").
9 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(b) (1999) (providing that the term "child with a disability" for 3 through 9
year olds may, at the discretion of the state and local educational agency, include a child "[w]ho is
experiencing developmental delays, as defined by the State and as measured by appropriate diagnostic
instruments and procedures, in one or more of the following areas: physical development, cognitive
development, communication development, social or emotional development, or adaptive development;
and ... [w]ho, by reason thereof, needs special education and related services") (emphasis added); see
also 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(B)(i) (2006) (conferring discretion to the state to include within the term
'child with disability' a child "experiencing developmental delays, as defined by the State and as
measured by appropriate diagnostic instruments" if such delays are in the areas of "physical
development, cognitive development, communication development, social development, emotional
development or adaptive development." See generally 34 C.F.R. § 300.313(a) (1999) (explaining that a
state which adopts the term "developmental delay" under section 300.7(b) may determine whether it
applies to children aged 3 through 9, or to a subset of that age range, for example, ages 3-5 and
maintaining that although a state may not compel a local educational agency to adopt and use the term
developmental delay for children within its jurisdiction those LEAs choosing to do so must employ the
state's definition).
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twenty-one years'O and meet both parts of a two-part test. First,
the student must satisfy the definition of one of the thirteen
disabilities listed at § 34 C.F.R. 300.7(c)(1)-(c)(13)i' or the state
criteria for "developmental delay." Second, the child must be in
need of special education and related services as a result of his or
her disability or disabilities. 12
Students who are eligible for special education and related
services under IDEA/2004 must receive an IEP.13 IEPs are
written documents14 formulated by an IEP team at an IEP
meeting.15 IEP placements must be provided in the "least
restrictive environment". 16
10 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.121 (2006) (mandating that every state have a policy in effect that ensures
that all children with disabilities between the ages of 3 and 21, residing in the state, have the right to
FAPE).
11 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(c)(1)-(c)(13) (1999).
12 See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(ii) (2006) (highlighting that under IDEA/2004 a child must not only
suffer from one of the thirteen enumerated disabilities, but he must also be in need of special education
or related services as a result of his disability in order to satisfy the two-part test).
13 See generally 34 C.F.R. § 300.122(a)(1) (1999) (explaining that a state need not provide IDEA
Part B services to children with disabilities aged 3, 4 or 5 if "inconsistent with state law or practice, or
the order of any court, respecting the provision of public education to children in one or more of those
age groups" and clarifying that if a state does not provide public education to nondisabled children
under age 6, then it is not required to provide services under IDEA Part B until such children attain age
6).
14 See 20 U.S.C § 1414(d)(i)(A)(i) (2006) (defining IEP (individualized education program) under
IDEA/2004 as "a written statement for each child with a disability that is developed, reviewed and
revised in accordance with" the requirements of IDEA/2004 and listing the specifics of these
requirements).
15 See 20 U.S.C §1414 (2006) (identifying both mandatory and permitted members of the IEP
team); see also Deal v. Hamilton County Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 857 (6th Cir. 2004) (annulling
IEP since parents' IEP participation was a matter of form and after the fact and determining that the IEP
team must engage in a genuine deliberative process about the disabled child's individual needs for
programs and services and provide the parents with a meaningful opportunity to participate in the
development of their child's IEP to avoid annulment); see generally Spielberg v. Henrico County Pub.
Sch., 853 F.2d 256, 258-59 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that parental involvement is essential in IEP
development and maintaining that after the fact involvement is not enough); Cf W.G. v. Bd. of
Trustees of Target Range Sch. Dist. No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1484-85 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that
procedural inadequacies that result in the loss of educational opportunities or seriously infringe the
parents' opportunity to participate in the IEP formulation process, result in a denial of FAPE).
16 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.550(b) (1999) providing that:
Each public agency shall ensure - (1) That to the maximum extent appropriate, children with
disabilities, including children in public or private institutions or other care facilities, are
educated with children who are non-disabled; and (2) That special classes, separate schooling or
other removal of children with disabilities from the regular educational environment occurs only
if the nature or severity of the disability is such that education in regular classes with the use of
supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.
Id. IDEA/2004 contains the same provision and defines "supplementary aids and services" as "aids,
services, and other supports that are provided in regular education classes or other education-related
settings to enable children with disabilities to be educated with nondisabled children to the maximum
extent appropriate". See 20 U.S.C § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2006); The term "on behalf of the child" includes
services that are provided to the parents or teachers of a child with a disability to help them work more
effectively with the child". 64 FR 12406, 12593 (Mar. 12, 1999) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300
and pt. 303); IDEA/2004 bars the states from using "a funding mechanism by which [they] distribute
(Vol. 21:1
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IDEA/2004, in § 614(d)(1)(A)(i) lists eight components that
must be included in every child's IEP.17 For disabled children
who have limited English proficiency, the IEP must state
whether the special education and related services the child
needs will be provided in a language other than English.I8
Section 614(d)(1)(A)(ii) further provides that "[n]othing in this
funds on the basis of the type of setting in which a child is served that will result in the failure to
provide a child with a disability a [FAPE] according to the unique needs of the child as described in the
child's IEP". See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(B)(i) (2006).
17 See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(l)(A)(i) (2006) requires that the eight components that must be
included in every child's IEP are:
(I) a statement of the child's present levels of academic achievement and functional
performance, including - (aa) how the child's disability affects the child's involvement and
progress in the general education curriculum and for preschool children, as appropriate, how
the disability affects the child's involvement and progress in the general education
curriculum; (bb) [omitted here]; (cc) for children with disabilities who take alternate
assessments aligned to alternate achievement standards, a description of benchmarks or short-
term objectives; (II) a statement of measurable annual goals, including academic and
functional goals designed to - (aa) meet the child's needs that result from the child's
disability to enable the child to be involved in and make progress in the general education
curriculum; and (bb) meet each of the child's other educational needs that result from the
child's disability; (1II) a description of how the child's progress toward meeting the annual
goals described in subclause (II) will be measured and when periodic reports on the progress
the child is making toward meeting the annual goals (such as through the use of quarterly or
other periodic reports, concurrent with the issuance of report cards) will be provided; (IV) a
statement of the special education and related services and supplementary aids and services,
based on peer-reviewed research to the extent practicable, to be provided to the child, or on
behalf of the child, and a statement of the program modifications or supports for school
personnel that will be provided for the child - (aa) to advance appropriately toward attaining
the annual goals; (bb) to be involved in and make progress in the general education
curriculum in accordance with subclause (1) and to participate in extracurricular and other
nonacademic activities; and (cc) to be educated and participate with other children with
disabilities and non-disabled children in the activities described in this subparagraph;(V) an
explanation of the extent, if any, to which the child will not participate with non-disabled
children in the regular class and in the activities described [above];(VI) (aa) a statement of
any individual appropriate accommodations that are necessary to measure the academic
achievement and functional performance of the child on State and district wide assessments
consistent with section 612(a)(16)(A); and (bb) if the IEP Team determines that the child
shall take an alternative assessment on a particular State or district wide assessment of student
achievement, a statement of why - (AA) the child cannot participate in the regular
assessment; and (BB) the particular alternative assessment selected is appropriate for the
child; (VII) the projected date for the beginning of the services and modifications described in
subclause (IV), and the anticipated frequency, location, and duration of those services and
modifications; and (VIII) beginning not later than the first IEP to be in effect when the child
is 16, and updated annually thereafter - (aa) appropriate measurable postsecondary goals
based upon age appropriate transition assessments related to training, education, employment,
and, where appropriate, independent living skills; (bb) the transition services (including
courses of study) needed to assist the child in reaching those goals; and (cc) beginning not
later than 1 year before the child reaches the age of majority under State law, a statement that
the child has been informed of the child's rights under this title, if any, that will transfer to the
child on reaching the age of majority under section 615(m).
Id.
18 See 20 U.S.C § 1414(d)(3)(B)(ii) (2006) (noting that the IEP team shall in the case of a child
with limited English proficiency, consider the language needs of the child as such needs relate to the
child's IEP).
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section shall be construed to require - - (I) that additional
information be included in a child's IEP beyond what is explicitly
required in this section; and (II) the IEP Team to include
information under 1 component of a child's IEP that is already
contained under another component of such IEP."19
IEPs must be reviewed at least annually by the IEP team. 20 At
these annual reviews, the efficacy of the child's IEP is examined
and appropriate changes are made in the IEP to meet the child's
then current needs.2 1 Once the IEP team determines that a child
is IDEA/2004 eligible, there must be an IEP in place for that
child at the beginning of that school year.22 IEP teams must
formulate the IEP before they make a placement decision.23
IDEA/2004 requires particularized written notice "whenever
the local educational agency - - (A) proposes to initiate or change;
or (B) refuses to initiate or change, the identification, evaluation,
or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free
appropriate public education to the child."24
19 See 20 U.S.C § 1414(d)(l)(A)(ii) (2006).
20 See 20 U.S.C §1414(d)(4)(A)(i) (2006) (explaining that the IEP must be reviewed periodically,
but not less then annually); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.343(c) (1999) (reiterating that the 1EP must be
reviewed at least annually to determine whether the annual goals for the child are being achieved).
21 See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(4)(A)(ii) (2006) (listing five factors IEP teams should consider in
recommending IEP changes); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.343(c)(2) (1999) (providing that revisions of an
IEP are appropriate to address any lack of expected progress toward the annual goals and the results of
any reevaluation, information about the child provided to, or by, the parents during the evaluation
process, and the child's anticipated needs as factors to be considered).
22 See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(2)(A) (2006) (requiring that the IEP must be in effect for each child
with a disability at the beginning of the school year); 34 C.F.R. § 300.342(a) (1999) (stating that "at the
beginning of each school year, each public agency shall have an IEP in effect for each child with a
disability within its jurisdiction").
23 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.552(a)(2) (explaining that in essence, placement means where the child's
IEP will be implemented and that this is controlled by what is the least restrictive environment for the
child); see generally 34 C.F.R. § 300.552(b)(2) (1999) (maintaining that placement is dependent on the
IEP); 34 C.F.R. § 300.552(c) (1999) (positing that generally, unless the IEP requires otherwise, the
child should be educated at the school he would otherwise attend if he were not disabled).
24 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3) (2006). Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of
2004 § 615 (c)(l) provides that:
The notice required by subsection (b)(3) shall include - - (A) a description of the action
proposed or refused by the agency; (B) an explanation of why the agency proposes or
refuses to take the action and a description of each evaluation procedure, assessment,
record, or report the agency used as a basis for the proposed or refused action; (C) a
statement that the parents of a child with a disability have protection under the procedural
safeguards of this part and , if this notice is not an initial referral for evaluation, the means
by which a copy of the description of the procedural safeguards can be obtained; (D)
sources for parents to contact to obtain assistance in understanding the provisions of this
part; (E) a descriptions of other options considered by the IEP Team and the reason why
those options were rejected; and (F) a description of the factors that are relevant to the
agency's proposal or refusal.
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A. Students with Disabilities who Attend Private Schools
The rights of students with disabilities who enroll in private
schools vary under IDEA/2004 depending on whether they were
placed in the private school by their parents or referred by the
school district. The reasons for the placement also impact on the
student's rights. Where, for example, a student with a disability
is placed at a private school selected by the district, the student
will retain all his or her procedural and substantive rights to a
FAPE, notwithstanding the fact that the placement is private. 25
However, under IDEA a private school student whose parents do
not dispute the appropriateness of the IEP has no individual
right to receive special education and related services. 26 More
nebulous is the situation where the parent(s) unilaterally place
their child in private school because they consider the IEP
offered to their child inadequate. Under these circumstances
there is an obligation to reimburse the parents for the cost of
private placement, but only if the parents prevail in an
administrative proceeding and establish that their child was
denied a FAPE under the Act and the private programs and/or
services met the student's special needs. 27 This situation is the
central focus of this article.
B. Child Find28
IDEA/2004 imposes an affirmative obligation on states and
local educational agencies to ensure that:
[a]ll children with disabilities residing in the State, including
children with disabilities who are homeless or are wards of
the State and children with disabilities attending private
schools, regardless of the severity of their disabilities, and
25 See 20 U.S.C §1412(a)(10)(B)(ii) (2006) (stating that in all such cases ". . . the State
educational agency shall determine whether such schools and facilities meet standards that apply to
State educational agencies and local educational agencies and that children so served have all the rights
the children would have if served by such agencies."); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.400-300.402 (1999)
(dealing with children with disabilities placed in or referred to private schools by public agencies).
26 See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.450-300.462 (1999) (outlining rights of private school children with
disabilities and responsibilities of local educational agencies); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.454(b)(4)
(1999) (providing "[t]he LEA shall make the final decisions with respect to the services to be provided
to eligible private school children").
27 See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(2) (2006) (allowing a court or hearing officer to require the
agency to reimburse the parents for private school placement of a child if that officer finds that a free
appropriate public education was not made available in a timely manner).
28 See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A) (2006) (imposing the "Child find" obligation on the State).
2006]
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who are in need of special education and related services, are
identified, located, and evaluated and a practical method is
developed and implemented to determine which children
with disabilities are currently receiving needed special
education and related services. 29
School districts' child find duties extend to all children with
disabilities starting at birth,30 irrespective of the age at which
children in that state are entitled to receive educational
services. 31 Since child find duties are "affirmative," a parent is
not required to request that a school district identify and
evaluate the child.32 The "child find" obligation is sweeping and
extends to "children with disabilities in the State who are
enrolled in private, including religious, elementary schools and
secondary schools."33 Child find activities must be "designed to
ensure the equitable participation of parentally placed private
school children with disabilities and an accurate count of such
children."34 Moreover, LEAs or SEAs, where applicable, must
undertake their child find activities in a manner similar to those
it employs for the agency's public school children.35 Child find
29 Id.
30 See 20 U.S.C. § 143 1(a)(1) (2006) (recognizing a need "to enhance the development of infants
and toddlers with disabilities, to minimize their potential for developmental delay, and to recognize the
significant brain development that occurs during a child's first 3 years of life").
31 See 20 U.S.C. § 1431(a) (2006) (stating "an urgent and substantial need" to aid in the
development of disabled children during the first few years of their lives).
32 See Robertson County Sch. Sys. v. King, No. 95-5526, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 27257, at *10
(6th Cir. Oct. 15, 1996) (interpreting the 1990 version of the act as "impos[ing] an affirmative duty on
the state to assure that 'all children residing in the State who are disabled ... and who are in need of
special education and related services are identified, located, and evaluated"').
33 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(A)(ii)(1) (2006); see 34 C.F.R. § 300.125(a)(1)(i) (1999) (requiring that
"Child Find" obligations include disabled children enrolled in private schools who are in need of
attention regardless of the severity of their disability); see also Child Find, 70 Fed. Reg. 35843
(proposed June 21, 2005) (to be codified 34 C.F.R. pt. 300.111) (requiring states to enact policies and
procedures to ensure disabled children are identified, located and evaluated); Child find for parentally-
placed private school children with disabilities, 70 Fed. Reg. 35845 (proposed June 21, 2005) (to be
codified 34 C.F.R. pt. 300.131) (requiring each LEA to identify, locate and evaluate all children with
disabilities enrolled by their parents in private institutions); Consistency with State policies, 70 Fed.
Reg. 35857 (proposed June 21, 2005) (to be codified 34 C.F.R. pt. 300.201) (requiring that LEAs have
in effect policies and procedures consistent with State policies and procedures).
34 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(A)(ii)(II) (2006);see also 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(l0)(A)(i) (2006)
(requiring school districts to devote funding to private school children with disabilities in the amount of
federal IDEA Part B funds proportionate to the number of children enrolled in private schools within
the district.); 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (a)(10)(A)(iii) (2006) (imposing the requirement that local education
agencies consult with representatives of private schools and parents of privately placed children during
the design and development of services for disabled children).
35 See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(A)(ii)(I1I) (2006) (stating that, in carrying out child find
requirements with respect to children enrolled in private schools, states shall utilize activities similar to
those undertaken for public school children).
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activities for children enrolled in private schools must be
completed in a time period comparable to that for children
attending public schools in the LEA.36
C. Complaint Procedures
Parents of children with disabilities may file a complaint
concerning the identification, evaluation, placement or provision
of FAPE to their child.37 This initiates the "due process" hearing
process to resolve the dispute. States have the option to
establish either one-tier or two-tier dispute resolution systems.
In a one-tier system the state educational agency conducts the
due process hearing. 38 In a two-tier system a hearing is
conducted by the local school district or other local or state
agency responsible for providing FAPE to that child, after which
either party may obtain review of the Tier I decision by the state
educational agency.39 Following the state level agency decision in
a Tier I or Tier II system a party aggrieved by a finding and
decision may "bring a civil action" in "any State court of
competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States
without regard to the amount in controversy." 40 Absent a
sufficient excuse, the parent must exhaust the state
36 See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(A)(ii)(V) (2006) (ensuring completion of child find obligations for
private school children in a manner comparable to public school children in the local educational
agency).
37 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6) (2006) (permitting any party to present a complaint "with respect to
any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the
provision of a free appropriate public education to such child").
38 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (f)(1)(A) (2006) (stating that parties to a complaint have the opportunity
of impartial review by the local educational agency or State educational agency as determined by State
law); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (i)(2)(A) (2006) (providing that an aggrieved party under the one-tier
system "shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint presented pursuant to
this section, which action may be brought in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district
court of the United States, without regard to the amount in controversy").
39 See 20 U.S.C. § 141 5 (g) (2006) (stating that State educational agency will conduct an impartial
review and reach an independent decision where the hearing required by subsection (h) was conducted
by a local educational agency); see also 20 U.S.C § 1415 (f)(1)(B) (2006) (requiring resolution sessions
prior to commencement of a due process hearing which may be waived on the parties' consent).
40 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (2006). IDEA/2004 provides that the court, in its review of the state
administrative proceedings, "(i) shall receive the record of the [state] administrative proceedings; (ii)
shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party; and (iii) basing its decision on the
preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate." 20 U.S.C
§ 1415(i)(2)(C) (2006). Since a civil action provides a mechanism for the review of the State
educational agency's decision at hearing, it provides a first level of review to parties in one-tier states
and an additional level of review to aggrieved parties in two-tier states. Id.
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administrative procedures before seeking relief in court that was
available under IDEA/2004's administrative procedures. 41
II. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
A. Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson School District v.
Rowley
Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School
District, Westchester County v. Rowley, 42 was the first United
States Supreme Court case to interpret the meaning of the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act. 43 In Rowley the
parents brought a civil action to review the New York State
Education Commissioner's determination that the local school
district had offered Amy Rowley an appropriate IEP for first
grade. 44 Amy was a deaf child with only minimal residual
hearing. Among the IEP components, were Amy's use of an FM
hearing aid, which would amplify words spoken into a wireless
receiver by the teacher or fellow students during certain
classroom activities, one hour per day of a tutor for the deaf, and
three hours each week of speech therapist services. Although the
parents agreed with parts of the IEP, they insisted that Amy be
provided with a qualified sign language interpreter in all of her
academic classes in lieu of the assistance proposed in other parts
of her IEP.45 In their civil action the parents claimed, among
other things, that the district had denied Amy a "free appropriate
public education".46 The United States District Court for the
41 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(1) (2006) (stating "[n]othing in this [chapter] shall be construed to restrict
or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, or other Federal laws protecting the
rights of children with disabilities, except that before filing a civil action under such laws seeking relief
that is also available under this part, the procedures under subsections (f) and (g) of this section shall be
exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the action been brought under this part"
(citations omitted)).
42 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
43 Id. at 187 (stating that this is the first case in which the Supreme Court has been called upon to
interpret any provision of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act); see generally Ed Halsell,
Disabled School Children: Where Are There Advocates?, 23 J. Juv. L. 65, 72 (2003) (stating "Rowley
is still the standard for the minimum level of accommodation a school district must provide to a
disabled child").
44 See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 184-85.
45 See id. Amy had been provided with an interpreter for a two-week experimental period.
Following this period the interpreter reported that Amy did not need his services at that time. Id.
46 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 185.
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Southern District of New York and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with the parents.47 In its
grant of certiorari, the Supreme Court agreed to consider the
meaning of the Act's requirement for a free appropriate public
education and the role of the state and federal courts in
exercising the review granted by section 1415(e)(2).48
In analyzing the role of the state and federal courts in
exercising their review granted by EHA's § 1415,49 the Court first
referred to the text of the statute which states that a court "...
shall receive the record of the [state] administrative proceedings,
shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party, and,
basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall
grant such relief as the court determines appropriate." 50
The Rowley Court determined that ". . . a court's inquiry in
suits brought under §1415(e)(2) is twofold." First, the court must
determine "if the State complied with the procedures set forth in
the Act?"51 Next, the court must determine whether "the
individualized program developed through the Act's procedures is
reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational
benefits."52 The Rowley Court made clear that the statute should
not be interpreted as inviting a court "to substitute their own
notions of sound educational policy for those of the school
authorities which they review."53 Moreover, the Court
interpreted the Act as severely limiting the role of courts in
"imposing their view of preferable educational methods upon the
states,"54 since that responsibility was assigned to "state and
47 Id. at 185-86 (noting that the District Court found that the disparity between Amy's
achievement and her potential led to the conclusion that she was not getting a free appropriate
education, a decision which a divided United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed).
48 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 186.
49 Education of the Handicapped Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-230, § 701-716, 84 Stat. 121, §
1415 (1970).
50 See Rowley, at 458 U.S. at 205 (quoting the Education of the Handicapped Act § 1415(e)(2)).
51 See id. at 206. The first inquiry includes determining whether the State has created an IEP for
the child in question which conforms with the requirements of § 1401(19), now § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)-
(VIII), of the Act. See id. at 207.
52 See id. at 206. The Rowley Court gave great weight to compliance with the procedures contained
in the Act, noting that "[w]e think that the Congressional emphasis upon full participation of concerned
parties throughout the development of the IEP, as well as the requirements that state and local plans be
submitted to the Secretary for approval, demonstrates the legislative conviction that adequate
compliance with the procedures prescribed would in most cases assure much if not all of what Congress
wished in the way of substantive content in an IEP." Id.
53 Id.
54 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207 (explaining the Court's rational in deferring to local authorities).
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local educational agencies in cooperation with the parents or
guardian of the child."55 Therefore, in the view of Rowley, "it
seems highly unlikely that Congress intended courts to overturn
a State's choice of appropriate educational theories in a
proceeding conducted pursuant to §1415(e)(2)."56 This
assessment of the Act's meaning leads invariably to the
conclusion that "once a court determines that the requirements of
the Act have been met, questions of methodology are for
resolution by the States."57
The Rowley Court unequivocally rejected the notion that under
the Act an "appropriate" education was one which "maximize[d]
the potential of each handicapped child commensurate with the
opportunity provided nonhandicapped children."58 Indeed, it
determined that the Act did not impose any particular
substantive educational standard upon the States.5 9 Instead,
FAPE "consists of access to specialized instruction and related
services which are individually designed to provide educational
benefit to the handicapped child."60 The Court recognized the
difficulty in determining whether "children are receiving
sufficient educational benefits to satisfy the requirements of the
Act" in light of the fact that "benefits obtainable by children at
one end of the spectrum will differ dramatically from those
obtainable at the other end, with infinite variations in
55 See id. (reiterating its reluctance to reevaluate the act).
56 See id. at 207-08
57 See id. at 208. Federal circuit courts have not been reluctant to overturn district court decisions
where the district court substituted its judgment for that of the state educational agency as to the
substantive adequacy of the IEP. See, e.g. Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186 (2d Cir.
2005). The circuit court reversed and remanded an award by the district court of summary judgment in
favor of the parents, where the impartial hearing officer and, on appeal, the state review officer, both
found in favor of the school district. Id. at 197. In terms of the district's compliance with procedural
requirements, the circuit court concluded that transcripts of multiple [IEP team] meetings showed the
parent participated in IEP development, that the draft documents presented to the parent at meetings
were adequate, that the parent was given a copy of the IEP before the school year began, and offered an
additional meeting upon learning of the parent's intent to unilaterally place her child in a private
residential school. Id. at 193. In terms of the district's compliance with substantive IDEA requirements,
the circuit court disagreed with the district court's findings that (1) the IEP failed to furnish enough one-
to-one instruction; (2) the student's passing grades did not convincingly evidence mastery of the
material she was taught; and (3) the IEP should have included counseling services. Id. at 196. The
Cerra Court stated: that "[i]n order to avoid impermissibly meddling in state educational methodology,
a district court must examine the record for any objective evidence indicating whether the child is likely
to make progress or regress under the proposed plan." Id. at 195.
58 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200.
59 See id. (finding that Congress' desire to provide specialized educational services, even in
furtherance of "equality," cannot be read as imposing any particular substantive educational standard
upon the States).
60 Rowley, 458 U.S. at201.
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between."61 The Court expressly refused "to establish any one
test for determining the adequacy of educational benefits
conferred upon all children covered by the Act",62 but instead
confined its analysis to situations like Amy's, that is, where the
child "is receiving substantial specialized instruction and related
services, and who is performing above average in the regular
classrooms of a public school system. . . ."63 The Court
highlighted that under such circumstances the program "should
be reasonably calculated to enable the child to achieve passing
marks and advance from grade to grade."64
In applying these principles to Amy's case the Supreme Court
concluded that, in light of Amy's better than average
performance compared to the average child in her class and her
easy advancement from grade to grade, the District Court and
Court of Appeals should not have concluded that the Act required
the school district to provide Amy with a sign language
interpreter. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals
was reversed. 65
B. Burlington
In School Committee of the Town of Burlington, Massachusetts
v. Department of Education of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, 66 the Supreme Court examined, for the first
time, the parents' right to reimbursement for their unilateral
placement of their handicapped child in a state-approved private
school under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act. In
its grant of certiorari the Court agreed to decide two issues:
"whether the potential relief available under the Act includes
reimbursement to the parents for private school tuition and
related expenses" 67 and, secondly, whether reimbursement is
61 Id. at 202.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 204.
65 Id. at 203, n.25 (stating "[w]e do not hold today that every handicapped child who is advancing
from grade to grade ... is automatically receiving a [FAPE]. In this case, however, we find Amy's
academic progress, when considered with the special services and professional consideration accorded
by the ... school administrators, to be dispositive.").
66 471 U.S. 359 (1985).
67 Id. at 367.
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barred "to parents who reject a proposed IEP and place a child in
a private school without the consent of local authorities."68
In deciding the first question, the Court examined the "grant of
authority" contained in the Act and determined that it was
sufficient to "order school authorities to reimburse parents for
their expenditures on private special education for a child if the
Court ultimately determines that such placement, rather than a
proposed IEP, is proper under the Act."69 According to the Court,
the phrase "grant such relief as [it] determines appropriate"
contained in the Act "confers broad [judicial] discretion." 70
Moreover, the Court concluded that since the statute did not
amplify on what "appropriate" meant, the term must be
interpreted "in light of the purposes of the Act." 71 That purpose is
principally to provide handicapped children with a free
appropriate public education. 72
The Burlington Court discussed two broad factual scenarios
that might occur in a reimbursement case. The first scenario,
perhaps more theoretical, involved disputes that are resolved
quickly during the same academic year. The second and more
likely scenario addresses situations where it takes years to come
to a conclusion. As to the first scenario the court stated that,
[i]n a case where a court determines that the private
placement desired by the parents was proper under
the Act and that an IEP calling for placement in a
public school was inappropriate, it seems beyond cavil
that "appropriate" relief would include a prospective
injunction directing the school officials to develop and
implement at public expense an IEP placing the child
in a private school.73
The Court, however, noted that, realistically, by the time these
cases reach the courts the school year will have expired, leaving
the parents with the grim choice of either accepting the IEP
offered by the public agency, notwithstanding its perceived
68 Id.
69 Id. at 369.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369.
73 Id. at 370.
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deficiencies, or front the cost of what they believe to be an
appropriate placement. As stated by the Court:
If they choose the latter course, which conscientious
parents who have adequate means and who are
reasonably confident of their assessment normally
would, it would be an empty victory to have a court
tell them several years later that they were right but
that these expenditures could not in a proper case be
reimbursed by school officials. If that were the case,
the child's right to a free appropriate public education,
the parents' right to participate fully in developing a
proper IEP, and all of the procedural safeguards
would be less than complete. Because Congress
undoubtedly did not intend this result, we are
confident that by empowering the court to grant
"appropriate" relief Congress meant to include
retroactive reimbursement to parents as an available
remedy in a proper case. 74
Significantly, the Supreme Court rejected the repeated
argument made by the Town of Burlington that tuition
reimbursement was a form of damages, concluding that
"[rleimbursement merely requires the Town to belatedly pay
expenses that it should have paid all along and would have borne
in the first instance had it developed a proper IEP."75 In reaching
this conclusion, the Court relied in part on the legislative history
that supported "a post hoc determination of financial
responsibility" as well as on regulations issued by the
Department of Education.76
Section 1415(e)(3) of the act states that "[d]uring the pendency
of any proceedings conducted pursuant to [§1415], unless the
State or local educational agency and the parents or guardian
otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then current
educational placement of the child."77 The Town of Burlington
argued that the parents' violation of this provision operated as a
waiver of any right they might otherwise have to reimbursement,
at least during any interim period in which their child's
placement violated this provision. The Supreme Court rejected
74 Id.
75 Id.at370-71.
76 Id. at 371.
77 Burlington, 471 U.S. at 371.
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this argument on two principal grounds. First, the language in
§1415(e)(3) "says nothing about financial responsibility, waiver,
or parental right to reimbursement at the conclusion of judicial
proceedings."78 Second, the Town's interpretation of this section
would in many instances defeat the purpose(s) of the Act "to give
handicapped children both an appropriate education and a free
one." 79 The Burlington Court ultimately decided that a parent's
failure to maintain a child in her current educational
environment during the pendency of the case does not constitute
a bar to reimbursement.
Finally, the Burlington Court made clear that the phrase "such
relief as the court determines is appropriate" contained in
§1415(e)(2) meant that "equitable considerations are relevant in
fashioning relief."80
C. Carter
In Florence County School District Four v. Carter,8 1 the
Supreme Court answered the question "whether [a handicapped
child's] parents are barred from reimbursement because the
private school in which [the child was enrolled] did not meet
[IDEA's definition] of a 'free appropriate public education."'8 2 In a
unanimous decision, the Court said they are not because FAPE
"requirements cannot be read as applying to parental
placements."8 3 According to the Court, the FAPE requirement
that special education and related services be "provided at public
expense, under public supervision and direction" and pursuant to
78 Id. at 372.
79 Id. Additionally, the Court noted that § 1415(e)(3) was housed in a section of the statute which
detailed "procedural safeguards which are largely for the benefit of the parents and the child." Id. at
373. However, the Court stated:
[w]hile we doubt that this provision would authorize a court to order parents to leave their
child in a particular placement, we think it operates in such a way that parents who
unilaterally change their child's placement during the pendency of review proceedings,
without the consent of the state or local school officials, do so at their own financial risk.
Id. at 373-74.
80 Id. at 374.
81 510 U.S. 7(1993).
82 Id. at 13. In 1990 EHA was renamed IDEA without significant changes in the substance of the
statute. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2006). This change was effected mainly to employ the term "disability"
rather than "handicapped." Id.
83 Carter, 510 U.S. at 13. This case came to the Supreme Court with two issues settled: "the school
district's proposed IEP was inappropriate under IDEA, and (2) although [the private school] did not
meet the ... requirements [for FAPE], it provided an otherwise proper education under IDEA". Id. at
12-13.
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§1414(a)(5), established, revised and reviewed by the public
agency, did not make sense in the context of a unilateral parental
placement.8 4 Therefore, to read §1401(18)'s FAPE definition8 5 "as
applying to [unilateral] parental placement would effectively
eliminate the right of unilateral withdrawal recognized in
Burlington" and "defeat this statutory purpose."8 6
In the same vein, the Supreme Court rejected the argument
that, in a reimbursement context, the private school must satisfy
the FAPE requirement that such school meet state
standards.8 7 Indeed, the Court made clear that "[p]arents' failure
to select a program known to be approved by the State in favor of
an unapproved option" and the presence on the faculty of
teachers not certified by the state is not a bar to
reimbursement.8 8 In short, as long as the student was denied
FAPE and the private placement was otherwise appropriate
under the Act, the remedy of reimbursement may be available to
the parents.
Finally, the Carter Court rejected the school district's
argument that allowing reimbursement to parents placed an
unreasonable burden on financially strapped school districts.8 9
As to the risk of suffering exorbitant judgments for tuition, the
Court pointed out that the Court's authority to "grant such relief
as the court determines appropriate" under §1415(e)(2) 90 confers
"broad discretion" in applying "equitable considerations,"
including adjusting any award which might be made "if the cost
of the private education was unreasonable."91
84 Id. at 13.
85 IDEA defines free appropriate public education as meaning:
special education and related services that- (A) have been provided at public expense,
under public supervision and direction, and without charge; (B) meet the standards of the
State educational agency; (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or
secondary school education in the State involved; and (D) are provided in conformity with
the individualized education program required under section 614(d) [20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)].
20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (2006).
86 Carter, 510 U.S. at 13-14.
87 Id. at 14.
88 Id. The court noted the irony of the school district arguing the private school did not meet state
standards when the district itself had failed to meet this student's needs and the private school program
was appropriate in this regard. Id.
89 Id. at 15. In response the Supreme Court said that all the district had to do to avoid
reimbursement claims was to do what the Act required: give the child FAPE in a public setting or
"place the child in an appropriate private setting of the State's choice." Id.
90 Id. at 15-16.
91 Carter, 510 U.S. at 16.
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III. TUITION REIMBURSEMENT92
A. No Reimbursement When FAPE Is Offered
IDEA/2004 expressly provides that a local educational agency
is not required to pay for the cost of education, including special
education and related services, when the agency made a FAPE
available but the parents, nonetheless, elected to place their
disabled child in a private school or facility. 93
B. Reimbursement When FAPE Is Denied
IDEA/2004, however, provides for the reimbursement remedy
where the agency denies the child a FAPE, stating that:
[ijf the parents of a child with a disability, who
previously received special education and related
services under the authority of a public agency, enroll
the child in a private elementary school or secondary
school without the consent of or referral by the public
agency, a court or a hearing officer may require the
agency to reimburse the parents for the cost of that
enrollment if the court or hearing officer finds that the
agency had not made a free appropriate public
education available to the child in a timely manner
prior to that enrollment. 94
92 In IDEA '97, Congress included, for the first time, express language that addressed the remedy
of tuition reimbursement. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997 §
612(a)(10)(C)(2). Reimbursement claims are different from compensatory education claims. See id.
Reimbursement claims seek payment for costs the family incurred in the past during periods that the
school district failed to offer a FAPE. See Ms. M. v. Portland Sch. Comm., 360 F.3d 267 (1st Cir. 2004)
where the court noted that "when [it] has used the term 'compensatory education,' it has usually
assumed that the remedies available involve prospective injunctive relief, which would not encompass
tuition reimbursement. Id. at 273. Compensatory education is a type of "prospective injunctive relief'
directing the school district to furnish services of a certain nature and quantity in the future to make up
programming failures in the past. See G v. Fort Bragg Dependent Schs., 343 F.3d 295, 309 (4th Cir.
2003).
93 The language in this provision remains unchanged from that contained in IDEA '97. See
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997 § 612(a)(10)(C)(1). Where the
tribunal determines that a FAPE was offered the parents' case is effectively over and analysis of the
merits of the unilateral placement and the equities will not ordinarily be required; however, where the
tribunal skips to an equities analysis and does not determine whether a FAPE was provided, a court will
remand to the lower tribunal for further findings. See, e.g., Goldstrom v. Dist. of Columbia, 319 F.
Supp. 2d 5, 6 (D.D.C. 2004).
94 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2006). This provision was contained in IDEA '97 and was
carried into the IDEA/2004 without change. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
Amendments of 1997 § 612(a)(10)(C)(I).
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Thus, IDEA/2004 makes express the reimbursement remedy
inferred by the Supreme Court in Burlington.95 Notably, neither
IDEA/2004, its implementing regulations or their predecessors,
establish specific criteria for determining whether the private
placement selected by the parents warrants reimbursement.
i. Scope of the Reimbursement Remedy
When Carter,96 came before the Supreme Court, the only issue
was whether the parents were barred from a tuition
reimbursement award because Trident, the private school in
which the parents had unilaterally placed their child, did not
meet IDEA's FAPE criteria.97 The Court determined that the
parents' unilateral placement did not bar them from
reimbursement. 98 The District Court had determined that
placement at Trident was proper for reimbursement purposes
based on the District Court's finding that Trident allowed the
petitioner's child to attain passing marks and progress from
grade to grade. 99 Consequently, the Fourth Circuit concluded
that Trident provided an "appropriate education.., reasonably
calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits."oo
Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit awarded the parents tuition and
other costs.
Perhaps the most common type of tuition reimbursement cases
in which parents prevail involves private day
95 Sch. Comm. of the Town of Burlington, Massachusetts v. Dep't of Ed. of the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 359 (1985). The 1999 regulations included the Burlington requirement that,
to qualify for reimbursement, the private placement must be appropriate for the child and the Carter
holding that a private school may be found appropriate for reimbursement purposes, even in the absence
of formal state approval for the private school, or its failure to meet state standards. The 1999 regulation
states:
[A] court or a hearing officer may require the agency to reimburse the parents for the cost
of that enrollment if the court or hearing officer finds that the agency had not made FAPE
available to the child in a timely manner prior to that enrollment and that the private
placement is appropriate. A parental placement may be found to be appropriate by a
hearing officer or a court even if it does not meet the State standards that apply to education
provided by the SEA and LEAs.
34 C.F.R. § 300.403(c) (1999). This regulation was carried forward into the proposed 2005 regulations
without change. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.148(c) (2006).
96 Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993).
97 Id. at 9.
98 Id. at 13 (holding that petitioner's parents are not barred from reimbursement).
99 Carter v. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four, 950 F.2d 156, 164 n.2 (4th Cir. 1991) (noting that
school district did not challenge the District Court's ruling that Trident provided Shannon Carter with
an "appropriate" education).
100 Id at 164
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school placements.101 However, reimbursement awards for
private residential placements where such placements are proper
under the Act are not unusual.102
Moreover, reimbursement awards are not restricted to private
school settings. Thus, parents may be reimbursed for private
tutoring when the school district has denied a FAPE and tutoring
is otherwise proper under the Act. 103 Reimbursement may also be
required where the school district denies a FAPE but concedes,
by stipulation, or otherwise, that the private placement is
appropriate. 104
Additionally, the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment does not bar reimbursement when the child attends
a sectarian school.105 Furthermore, IDEA itself does not contain
language which would prevent reimbursement based on the
101 See, e.g., Zayas v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, No. 05-2376, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS
28323, at *4 (1 st Cir. Dec. 21, 2005) (affirming district court's reimbursement for temporary placement
in a private day school when public school was unable to provide child with FAPE); Shapiro v. Paradise
Valley Unified Sch. Dist. No. 69, 317 F.3d 1072, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2003) (allowing reimbursement for
private day school); Union Sch. Dist. v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519, 1527-28 (9th Cir. 1997) (affirming district
court's determination that parents should be reimbursed for unilaterally placing child in private day
school); Drew P. v. Clarke County Sch. Dist., 877 F.2d 927 (1 1th Cir. 1989); Jefferson County Bd. of
Ed. v. Breen, 853 F.2d 853 (1 lth Cir. 1988); Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Ed., 790
F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1986); Hall v. Vance County Bd. of Ed., 774 F.2d 629 (4th Cir. 1985).
102 See, e.g., Lamoine Sch. Comm. v. Ms. Z., 353 F. Supp. 2d 18, 32 (D.Me. 2005) (finding
reimbursement appropriate when child attended private residential school); New Paltz Cent. Sch. Dist.
v. St. Pierre, 307 F. Supp. 2d 394, 402 (N.D.N.Y. 2004) (ordering tuition, room and board, laptop
computer expenses to be reimbursed); Scorah v. Dist. of Columbia, 322 F. Supp. 2d 12, 22 (D.D.C.
2004) (ordering reimbursement for unilateral placement of student with emotional disturbance and
learning disabilities); Gerstmyer v. Howard County Public Schs., 850 F. Supp. 361, 364-66 (D.Md.
1994) (awarding private school tuition and tutoring fees when district failed to make timely evaluation
and placement of child due to budgetary and systemic constraints).
103 See, e.g., Gerstmyer, 850 F.Supp. at 366 (awarding private school tuition and tutoring fees to
parents when district failed to make timely evaluation and placement of child due to budgetary and
systemic constraints); Union Sch. Dist. v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519, 1528 (9th Cir. 1994) (granting relief to
a family after public school's failure to provide FAPE); W.G. v. Bd. of Trs., 960 F.2d 1479, 1487 (9th
Cir. 1992) (reimbursing parents for tutoring).
104 See Kantor v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 90-828 (CRR), 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1158, at *10
(D.D.C. Jan. 31, 1991) (ordering reimbursement when parties agreed that chosen private placement was
appropriate).
105 See, e.g., L.M. v. Eversham Twp. Bd. of Ed., 256 F. Supp. 2d 290, 304-05 (D.N.J. 2003)
(holding that reimbursing a family for placing their child in a sectarian school did not violate the
establishment clause); Christen G. v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 919 F. Supp. 793, 818-19 (E.D.Pa.
1996) (stating that reimbursement for sectarian education "will not foster an excessive government
entanglement with religion"); Doolittle v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 919 P.2d 334, 343-44 (Idaho
1996) (ordering reimbursement for parochial school when district violated IEP procedures and failed to
offer program to child with hearing impairment).
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religious character of the school. Rather, the 2004 amendments
suggest such reimbursement is permissible.O6
Courts have awarded reimbursement for related and other
services which were proper in meeting children's special needs,
including a wide variety of therapiesl0 7 and transportation
expenses.108 Moreover, parents have been successful in obtaining
reimbursement for the costs they incurred in making special
living arrangements for the child in order to obtain needed
special services. 109 Additionally, where home-based programs are
proper, school districts have been ordered to pay for
them.110 Some courts have even compensated parents for the
services they provided their own child due to a denial of a FAPE
and the unavailability or impracticality of obtaining such
services elsewhere.l'
106 See 20 U.S.C § 1412(a)(10)(A)(i)(l1l) (2006) (establishing that states are eligible for federal
funds for "parentally placed private school children with disabilities ... [placed in] private, including
religious schools, to the extent consistent with law").
107 See, e.g., Deptford Twp. Sch. Dist. v. H.B., No. 01-0784(JBS), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11602,
at *45--49 (D.N.J. June 15, 2005) (awarding parents for tuition costs, occupational and speech therapy);
Johnson v. Lancaster-Lebanon Intermediate Unit 13, 757 F. Supp. 606, 622-23 (E.D.Pa. 1991) (ruling
in favor of parent for reimbursement of speech therapy); Rapid City Sch. Dist. 51-4 v. Vahle, 733 F.
Supp. 1364, 1370-71 (D.S.D 1990) (allowing reimbursement for occupational therapy); Max M. v. Ill.
State Bd. of Ed., 629 F. Supp. 1504, 1520 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (ordering payment for psychotherapy).
108 See, e.g., Carter v. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four, 950 F.2d 156, 165 (4th Cir. 1991)
(affirming district court award of transportation costs to and from school, and four trips home per year
for the student); Dist. of Columbia v. Ramirez, 377 F. Supp. 2d 63, 70-71 (D.D.C. 2005) (requiring
district to provide dedicated aide to accompany student from his apartment door to bus and dedicated
transportation aide on bus in addition to transportation itself); David P. v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist, No.
98-1856, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15160, at *21 (E.D.Pa. Sept. 18, 1998) (requiring reimbursement for
travel, lodging, and out-of-pocket costs of parent training trips).
109 See, e.g., Ojai Unified Sch. Dist. v. Jackson, 4 F.3d 1467, 1478 (9th Cir. 1993) (ordering
payment of board costs for child with grandparents who lived near appropriate placement); Jenkins v.
Fla., 931 F.2d 1469, 1471 (1Ith Cir. 1991) (affirming district court decision for reimbursement of
maintenance fees for children in residential placements, including payments from insurance and other
third party sources).
110 See, e.g., Still v. DeBuono, 101 F.3d 888, 894 (2d Cir. 1996) (reimbursing for in-home
program therapy service specialized in treating children with autism).
111 In Bucks County Dep't. of Mental Health/Mental Retardation v. Commonwealth of Pa., Dep't.
of Pub. Welfare, 379 F.3d 61 (3d Cir. 2004), for example, the court ordered the district to pay parent for
her time in furnishing Lovaas therapy to her two-year old disabled child where county denied a FAPE.
See id. at 75. The court determined that paying the parent was a form of reimbursement, not damages as
the district contended. Id. Further, it refused to limit the definition of reimbursement to out-of-pocket
expenses. See id. at 68. The court also rejected the district's contention that twenty-two dollars per hour
was excessive since it was in the range of what providers in the county were being paid for such
services. See id. at 69. The district further argued that Congress did not anticipate parents being
reimbursed for services to their own child since such assistance was in essence was what an involved
parent was expected to do. See id. at 71. The court stated that the parent went above and beyond what a
typical parent was expected to do and in effect "stepped into the shoes of the therapist". See id. at 73.
Finally, the court rejected the suggestion that awarding reimbursement here would have far reaching
effects. See id. at 75. The courts have even reimbursed parents for lost earnings resulting from their
providing services to their child. See Bd. of Ed. v. Dienelt, 843 F.2d 813, 815 (4th Cir. 1988). However,
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ii. Determinations as to Denial of FAPE112
1. Procedural Inadequacies.
In Shapiro v. Paradise Valley Unified School District No. 69,113
the school district failed to include the child's teacher from the
private school where the child received special education services
in the IEP meeting." 4 This violation, according to the court,
denied the child a FAPE.115 Due to the school district's
procedural violation, resulting in a loss of educational
opportunity for the child, the court found it unnecessary to
address the second prong of the Burlington FAPE analysis, that
is, whether the proposed IEP was substantively adequate.U 6 As a
result of the district's denial of a FAPE to the child, the court
deemed the unilateral placement selected by the parents proper
under the Act and granted their request for tuition
reimbursement. 117
Since adequate evaluative information is necessary to
determine the child's needs and develop appropriate IEP goals
for the child, incomplete evaluationsilS or the complete absence
there must be at least some evidence of training and ability on the part of the parents in providing the
necessary therapy. In Dombrowski v. Wissahickon Sch. Dist., No. 01-5094, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19481, at *26 (E.D.Pa. Sept. 30, 2003), for example, the court denied reimbursement to parent where
there was no evidence parent received training or implemented or secured appropriate program. Id.
112 See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(f)(3)(e)-(f) (2006).
113 317 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2003).
114 Id. at 1074 (finding that the school district effectively denied a deaf student a FAPE as a result
of its failure to include a teacher from the child's private educational placement and her parents in an
IEP meeting).
115 Id. Looking to § 1401(a)(20) of IDEA, and its implementing regulation at 34 C.F.R. § 300.344
the court concluded that when the child receives special education services at her current private school,
the statute mandates that not just any teacher, but the child's regular teacher, or a teacher qualified to
provide education in the type of program in which the child may be placed, participate in the meeting.
See id. at 1077. The reason for this finding was based on the fact that "IDEA requires the persons most
knowledgeable about the child to attend the IEP meeting." Id. at 1076. A New York court came to a
similar conclusion where a district, in violation of 34 C.F.R § 300.349(a)(2) and the parallel state
regulation, failed to have a representative from the child's therapeutic placement at an IEP meeting. See
Werner v. Clarkstown Cent. Sch. Dist., 363 F. Supp. 2d 656, 657-59 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Due to this
transgression, the child's parents were denied an opportunity to ask questions or raise concerns about
the proposed placement with knowledgeable individuals. Id.
116 Shapiro, 317 F.3d at 1078-79 (observing that because the IEP failed to include a statement of
child's present educational level and how such determinations were made, it was unnecessary to
proceed to test's second prong).
117 Id. at 1080 (reimbursing parents for costs of educating their child for 1994-1995 school year).
118 See Roca v. D.C., No. 02-01646(HHK), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5130, at *5 (D.C. Mar. 14,
2005) (contending that evaluations were inadequate and failed to identify the need for a broad range of
services, including speech/ language therapy).
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of an evaluation119 will result in a denial of FAPE. However,
relatively minor procedural violations occurring after
development of a substantively adequate IEP, where the district
otherwise complied with the procedures mandated by the Act,
will not result in a denial of FAPE.120
Yet, since parental participation in the formulation of the IEP
goes to the heart of the Act, a school district's failure to include
parents in IEP development will almost certainly result in a
denial of FAPE.121 However, when the parents have knowingly
executed a written waiver of their attendance at the IEP meeting
at which the IEP is developed, their absence will not be
considered a deficiency resulting in a denial of FAPE.122 Where,
however, procedural errors by the district in developing the
student's IEP are harmless and non-prejudicial to the parents,
courts will not construe such errors as resulting in a denial of
FAPE.123
Finally, the courts have found that procedural inadequacies
may deprive a child of educational benefits. One example of this
type of FAPE violation occurs when a district fails to timely
convene an IEP meeting and, as a result of this failure, a student
is denied educational benefits he should have received at an
earlier time. 124
119 See New Paltz Cent. Sch. Dist. v. St. Pierre, 307 F. Supp. 2d 394, 401 (N.D.N.Y. 2004)
(deciding failure to initiate evaluations results in denial of FAPE).
120 See, e.g., Parents Denied Reimbursement for at-Home Autism Services, 16 EARLY CHILDHOOD
REP. 10 (2005) (describing holding which found that a child was not denied FAPE despite the district's
error in failing to provide parents written notification that their request for at-home autism service was
being denied).
121 See, e.g., Shapiro, 317 F.3d at 1078 (stating, "those individuals, like [the child's] parents, who
have first-hand knowledge of the child's needs and who are most concerned about the child must be
involved in the IEP creation process."); N. Kitsap Sch. Dist. v. K.W., 123 P.3d 469, 478 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2005) (denying grandparents meaningful opportunity to participate in developing student's IEP
constituted serious procedural error); Bd. of Educ. of County of Cabell v. Dienelt, 843 F.2d 813, 815
(4th Cir. 1988) (holding failure to consult with child's parents when developing IEP constitutes
procedural default rendering IEP fatally flawed).
122 See Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of N.Y. v. Mills, 03 Civ. 0050(RCC), 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13741, at *13-15 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2005) (explaining school's record of waiver aided
court's determination that parent validly waived right to attend CSE meeting).
123 See Lundvall v. Bd. of Educ. of Anne Arundel County, No. JFM-05-646, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18824, at *11 (D.Md. Aug. 31, 2005) (finding absence of general educator at IEP meeting non-
fatal because student did not lose educational opportunities).
124 See Shapiro, 317 F.3d at 1079 (requiring loss of educational opportunity where there have been
procedural errors); but see Tice v. Botetourt County Pub. Sch., 908 F.2d 1200, 1206 (4th Cir. 1990)
(explaining tardy completion of evaluations alone constitutes FAPE violation).
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2. Substantive Denial of FAPE.
Since neither IDEA nor its implementing regulations provide a
substantive standard for a FAPE, courts have been forced to
supply its meaning on a case-by-case basis, in light of the child's
unique needs.125 It is clear from Rowley that, under IDEA, school
districts are not obligated to provide the best possible educational
services unless the state where the child resides sets a higher
standard. In such cases the state standard controls and its
criteria are incorporated into the federal FAPE requirement.126
Next, as explained above, Rowley requires that the IEP provide
"some educational benefit."127 Unfortunately, Rowley did not
elaborate on what this means. The Rowley court did state the
benefit it mandates varies with the individual characteristics of
the child.128 Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit
16,129 the leading post-Rowley case on substantive FAPE, said
that IDEA required an IEP to provide "more than a trivial
educational benefit"130 and "significant learning."131 Moreover,
Polk explained that what was appropriate could not be reduced to
a single standard and "must be gauged in relation to the child's
potential."132 Thus, Polk followed Rowley's guidance concerning a
sliding scale of expectation depending on the individual
characteristics of the child.133 Where the child has participated
unsuccessfully in substantially similar programs in the recent
125 See County of San Diego v. Cal. Special Educ. Hearing Office, 93 F.3d 1458, 1467 (9th Cir.
1996) (stating that "educational benefit is not limited to academic needs, but includes the social and
emotional needs that affect academic progress, school behavior and socialization").
126 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.13 (1999) (noting that the term free appropriate public education or FAPE
"means special education and related services that ... meet the standards of the SEA"); see also Amann
v. Stow Sch. Sys., 982 F.2d 644, 649 (1 st Cir. 1992) (explaining that where states create standards more
stringent than federal rule, the district must also satisfy state requirements).
127 Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester County v. Rowley, 458
U.S. 176, 200 (1982) (concluding that "[i]mplicit in the congressional purpose of providing access to a
'free appropriate public education' is the requirement that the education to which access is provided be
sufficient to confer some educational benefit upon the handicapped child").
128 See id. at 202-203 (explaining how different students may respond very differently to same
instruction).
129 853 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1988).
130 Id. at 180.
131 Id. at 182.
132 Id. at 185.
133 See id. at 177 (urging individualized programs).
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past, to those now proposed, such programs will be deemed to fail
a substantive FAPE test.134
Assessing the merits of an IEP sometimes involves weighing
academic progress against the benefits of contacts with non-
disabled peers, the so-called academic gain/socialization
fulcrum.' 35 Rather than emphasizing how much should be
learned, the onus of an assessment usually focuses on what
should be learned or emphasized. This fulcrum of benefits
problem arises most often with children with severe impairments
and it is exceedingly difficult to resolve. Sometimes a child is so
impaired that no meaningful academic instruction can occur and
the substantive FAPE turns to which basic functional skills
should be taught to the child.136 Children falling at this end of
the continuum may only be able to benefit from instruction in
activities of daily living, self-care and travel training, for
example. IDEA's implementing regulations contemplate
programs and services for meeting the unique needs of children
with such limitations.
Another aspect of the substantive FAPE question is whether
the benefits conferred in the IEP must generalize across settings
to be adequate. In J.S.K. v. Hendry County School Board,137 the
court held that there was no requirement of such broad
generalization. J.S.K. involved a 15-year-old student with autism
and mental retardation who displayed aggressive, maladaptive
and self-injurious behaviors both at home and school. Under the
IEP in effect prior to trial, this student made material gains at
school.138 However, the student's gains had not manifested in
other settings, namely the home, leading the parents to claim
that the proposed IEP was inadequate. The parents sought,
134 See, e.g., Mrs. B. v. Milford Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 1114, 1117-18 (2d Cir. 1997) (describing
how continued placement in special education classroom worsened child's conditions); Stockton v.
Barbour County Bd. of Educ., No. 95-1809, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 9877, at *3-4 (4th Cir. May 5,
1997) (determining public school placement insufficient where it had previously caused student with
special needs to suffer academically and emotionally).
135 See Roland M. and Miriam M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 993 (1st Cir. 1990)
(holding that "an appropriate educational plan ... requires a balancing of the marginal benefits to be
gained or lost on both sides of the maximum benefit/least restrictive fulcrum").
136 See, e.g., Timothy W. v. Rochester, N.H. Sch. Dist., 875 F.2d 954, 973 (1st Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 983 (1989) (concluding that all handicapped children, regardless of the severity of
their handicap, are entitled to a FAPE, but that "education for the severely handicapped is to be broadly
defined, to include not only traditional academic skills, but also basic functional life skills, and that
educational methodologies in these areas are not static, but are constantly evolving and improving").
137 941 F.2d 1563 (11 th Cir. 1991).
138 See id. at 1573.
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through the IEP team, a residential placement. In rejecting the
parents' assertion, the court "define[d] 'appropriate education' as
making measurable and adequate gains in the classroom." 139 The
court further highlighted that "[i]f meaningful gains across
settings means more than making measurable and adequate
gains in the classroom, they are not required by [IDEA] ."140 The
Eleventh Circuit's J.S.K decision regarding the "generalization of
gains" has generally been followed. 141
In M.C. ex rel J.C. v. Central Regional School District,142
however, the court gave a broader meaning to FAPE than the
Eleventh Circuit. It expressly held that FAPE includes the
obligation to teach skills in a manner that will foster
generalization of the target skills to other aspects of daily
life. 143 This decision is more in line with the language and spirit
of IDEA than the Eleventh Circuit's decision. It recognizes,
consistent with Rowley, that school districts must address
children's unique needs after conducting individualized
evaluations. Moreover, unlike J.S.K. and its progeny, it
recognizes that an appropriate education includes much more
than formal academic subjects.144
Next, courts may sometimes find an IEP substantively
deficient based on the IEP's very structure. For example, an IEP
may be found deficient where it lacks statements of the child's
present level of educational performance, goals relevant to the
student's needs as identified in their evaluation(s), a sufficiently
specific description of the specialized instruction the child will
receive or objective evaluation criteria with which to measure
progress. 145
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 In Weiss by & Through Weiss v. Sch. Bd. of Hillsborough County, 141 F.3d 990 (1 1th Cir.
1998) the court held that an IEP for an autistic child was sufficient, as the child improved academically
and behaviorally at school. See id. at 997. The court, in interpreting whether adequate educational
benefits had been conferred, held that "adequate educational benefits refer to a basic floor of
opportunity which might not have existed without the IDEA." See id.
142 81 F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 1996).
143 See id. at 394 (describing deficiencies in child's education were result of inappropriate IEP that
failed to give child opportunity to learn skills applicable to everyday life).
144 See, e.g., Calloway v. Dist. of Columbia, 216 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (noting that IDEA
requires a FAPE "emphasiz[ing] special education and related services designed to meet their unique
needs and prepare them for employment and independent living").
145 See Briere v. Fair Haven Grade Sch. Dist., 948 F. Supp. 1242, 1250 (D. Vt. 1996) (describing
specific statutory components of IEPs); see also Evans v. Bd. of Educ., 930 F. Supp. 83, 95 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (highlighting that an IEP must contain "appropriate objective criteria and evaluation procedures
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A proposed public placement is evaluated prospectively, that is
as of the time it was developed, rather than retrospectively with
the benefit of 20/20 hindsight.146 In the same vein, the IEP's
merits are not measured by comparing it to the current private
school program. 147 Notwithstanding the difficulty in defining a
substantive FAPE, there are certain types of violations which
will almost always result in the substantive denial of a FAPE
and will provide the opportunity for reimbursement for programs
and services purchased by the parents.
Additionally, school districts must ensure that a child's IEP is
in effect by the beginning of the school year and that the parents
are provided a copy. 148 Mailing the IEP to the parents less than
one week prior to the start of the school year does not violate
IDEA's procedural requirements.149 Where, however, the district
fails to propose an IEP until three weeks after the school year
and schedules for determining, on at least an annual basis, whether instructional objectives are being
achieved").
146 In Adams v. Or., 195 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 1999), the Ninth Circuit refused to judge the efficacy
of an IFSP in hindsight. See id. at 1149. The Third Circuit also refused to judge the appropriateness of
an IEP in retrospect, noting that the "appropriateness [of an IEP] is judged prospectively so that any
lack of progress under a particular IEP . . .does not render that IEP inappropriate." Carlisle Area Sch. v.
Scott P., 62 F.3d 520, 530 (3d Cir. 1995). The First Circuit has framed the question as not whether the
IEP achieved perfect academic results, "but whether it was 'reasonably calculated' to provide an
,appropriate' education as defined in federal and state law." See Roland M.. v. Concord Sch. Comm.,
910 F.2d 983, 992 (1st Cir. 1990). In D.F. v. Ramapo Cent. Sch. Dist., 430 F.3d 595 (2d Cir. 2005),
both the state review officer and the district court assessed the substantive validity of the IEP based on a
retrospective analysis of the IEP's efficacy. See id. at 598. Since neither party had briefed that issue or
raised it in the court below, the Second Circuit remanded to the district court directing the district court
to determine whether it was error to consider retrospective evidence in assessing the substantive quality
of the IEP. Id. at 599. The D.F. court pointed out that there might be value in distinguishing between
claims which challenge the validity of a proposed IEP and those which question an existing IEP on the
ground that it should have been modified based on changed circumstances, new information or proof of
failure. Id. at 599 n.3. It is posited that the latter view is very significant. A child should not go an entire
school year, receiving programs and services that do not meet the child's needs, especially during
developmentally critical periods.
147 See Andrew M. v. Del. County Office of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, No. 03-6134,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5819, *37 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 7, 2005) (explaining that "the issue.., is not what
hindsight shows, but whether [the program proposed] was appropriate at [the time it was offered]").
148 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.342(a) (1999) (mandating that "[a]t the beginning of each school year,
each public agency shall have an IEP in effect for each child with a disability within its jurisdiction");
34 C.F.R. § 300.345(f) (1999) (providing that "[tihe public agency shall give the parent a copy of the
child's IEP at no cost to the parent").
149 The Second Circuit has found that a school district fulfilled its legal obligations by providing
the IEP before the first day of school. See Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186, 194 (2d Cir.
2005). Arguably this holding conflicts with parents' due process rights under IDEA. Receipt of an IEP a
few days before commencement of the school year hardly provides sufficient time for a parent to
evaluate the merits of the IEP, comply with the required notice provisions respecting the child's
removal, evaluate alternative placements for the child, make formal application to the private school(s),
arrange, if necessary, for financing for the alternative placement and contract, if necessary, for
transportation to implement the alternative placement.
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begins, the delay will be deemed to deprive the student of FAPE,
which, in a proper case, may warrant reimbursement.150
Although an IEP is not a guarantee that the child will achieve
the goals set out therein, it amounts to a promise by the school
district to implement the IEP's provisions.15 1 For example, in
Roca v. District of Columbia,152 the IEP did not include therapy
and counseling that an independent evaluation showed the
student required for FAPE. Substantive violations have also been
found where an IEP is not implemented or where the IEP fails to
provide for appropriate related services.
Finally, courts have held school districts liable for child find
violations in individual cases where the districts were on notice
of the child's academic difficulties but failed to initiate
appropriate identification and evaluation activities.153
In the leading tuition reimbursement case, Doe v. Metropolitan
Nashville Public Schools,t54 the Sixth Circuit reversed the
district court's dismissal of the parents' claim alleging child find
violations and remanded the case for trial.155 Doe involved a
"learning disabled" and "emotionally disturbed" child156 who had
150 See Kitchelt v. Weast, 341 F. Supp. 2d 553, 556-57 (D. Md. 2004) (stating receipt of lEP plan
three weeks after school began warranted reimbursement); see also Evans v. Bd. of Educ. of the
Rhinebeck Cent. Sch. Dist., 930 F. Supp. 83, 95-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that there was a denial of
a FAPE where proper 1EP was not ready to implement at the start of school year).
151 See Ms. M. v. Portland Sch. Comm., No. 02-169-P-H, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8552, at *45-6
(D. Me. May 20, 2003) (affirming a hearing officer's determination that, because the district failed to
fully implement the reading segment of a fifth-grade student's program, the district was required to
reimburse the family for the costs incurred in hiring a private reading tutor).
152 No. 02-01646(HHK), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5130 (D.D.C. Mar. 14,2005).
153 Its been held that "in order to establish that the school violated the identification requirements
of IDEA, [p]laintiff must show that school officials overlooked clear signs of disability and were
negligent in failing to order testing, or that there was no rational justification for not deciding to
evaluate." Clay T. v. Walton County Sch. Dist, 952 F. Supp. 817, 823 (M.D. Ga. 1997). In the absence
of such notice, however, courts have been reluctant to provide reimbursement or other remedies for
such failures notwithstanding the affirmative nature of the child find obligation. See Alex K. v.
Wissahickon Sch. Dist., No. 03-854, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1994, at *28-29 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2004).
The District Court, for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, for example, found that a district did not
violate its child find obligations when the district was not on notice that the student was receiving
speech and language services, and no evaluations of the student were shared with the district. Id.
Similarly, the District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin found a local district did not violate
the child find requirements by failing to initiate an evaluation of a child who slept in class and whose
grades were slipping. See Hoffman v. East Troy Cmty. Sch. Dist., 38 F. Supp. 2d 750, 764-65 (E.D.
Wis. 1999). After all, "[n]either due process nor federal law imposes an obligation upon school districts
to test every child whose grades are gradually slipping..." Russo v. Chippewa Valley Sch. Dist., No.
95-CV-73484, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8639, at *10 (E.D. Mich. May 21, 1996).
154 133 F.3d 384 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 813 (1998).
155 Id. at 388 (explaining reimbursement may be granted, despite lack of communication between
child's parents and the school, where the school district does not follow proper "child find" procedures).
156 Id. at 385.
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never attended the public schools. Rather he attended private
special education at the parents' expense prior to, and after, the
dispute arose. 157 The district court held that, because Doe had
been unilaterally placed by his parents and the school district
had not been given the opportunity to evaluate Doe or create an
IEP for him, it was not obligated to reimburse the Does.158 The
Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that where, as
here, the parents claimed "the lack of dialogue stems from the
school district's failure to conduct sufficient 'child find,'
reimbursement may be appropriate."' 59
The district argued that the parents' general knowledge of the
availability of services should bar the claim.160 However, the
circuit court viewed child find failures as procedural violations
which could, if sufficiently serious, justify reimbursement,161
further holding that the parents' general knowledge of the
availability of services did not bar recovery as a matter of
law.162 Finding sufficient factual questions, the Doe court
directed that, on remand, the district court balance "the extent of
the Does' knowledge" of their substantive and procedural rights
against the "the degree of [the school district's] laxity."163 The
court further directed that, in applying this balancing test, it
should give "due weight ... to the [administrative law judge's]
determinations". 164
In Lakin ex rel. Lakin v. Birmingham Public Schools,165 the
Sixth Circuit affirmed an award for partial tuition
reimbursement for services rendered at an out-of-state
therapeutic residential school to a student who required
157 See id. (explaining parents paid for private school, but wanted reimbursement for tuition before
seeking IEP from public school district).
158 Id.
159 Metropolitan Nashville, 133 F.3d at 387-88 (highlighting that "[t]here is a distinction, though,
between parents who act unilaterally after consultation with the school system, and those who act
unilaterally without any dialogue with the school").
160 Id. at 387 (noting that the school district "argues that even if the district court had used the
proper standard, it was still entitled to summary judgment because of the Does' admitted knowledge of
the general availability of services").
161 Id. at 388 (holding that "[e]ven though the Does had some general knowledge of the
availability of services, the failure by Metro to apprise the Does of their specific procedural and
substantive rights could make reimbursement a proper remedy").
162 Id. (holding parents' awareness of availability of services did not operate as bar to recovery).
163 Id.
164 Id. at 386.
165 Lakin v. Birmingham Pub. Schs, No. 02-1137, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 13953 (6th Cir. July 9,
2003).
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psychiatric help.166 In Lakin, the district failed to develop an
appropriate IEP until seven months after the child's removal to
the private residential placement. The court limited its
reimbursement award to the period between the child's removal
and the date on which the district offered an appropriate
IEP.167 This left the parents responsible for approximately eight
months tuition, corresponding to the time during which the
student remained in the private school after an adequate IEP
was offered. 168
A number of other judicial decisions have resulted in tuition
awards based on child find violations.169 In other decisions
involving child find claims, courts have found parents presented
colorable claims for reimbursement or other relief sufficient to
deny school districts' motions to dismiss.170
iii. Determining Whether the Unilateral Placement Selected by
the Parents Was Proper under the Act.
Determining a parent's right to reimbursement for private
placement requires a determination as to whether the placement
was appropriate, not perfect.171 An "appropriate" private
166 See id. at * 1-3. At the time the parents removed the student to the private school, the district
had failed to advise the parents of their procedural and substantive rights under IDEA. Id. at 2. In
reliance on Metropolitan Nashville, the Lakin court further held that the district's failure to comply with
the Act's child find provisions may suffice as grounds for reimbursement of an injured party's private
placement costs. Id. at *2-3.
167 Id. at *34 (affirming district court's grant of partial reimbursement).
168 See id. at *4. Assuming the court of appeals was correct as to the adequacy of the IEP, the
timing of the offer is significant. Here, the IEP was offered in May, that is, prior to the end of the school
year. It would seem educationally unsound to disrupt the child's program mid-semester merely because
an appropriate IEP was finally offered. Moreover, the effects on the child of removing him from a
placement necessitated by the school district's failure to offer a FAPE should be an equitable
consideration in determining the time period for which a reimbursement award will be given.
169 See, e.g., New Paltz Cent. Sch. Dist. v. St. Pierre, 307 F. Supp. 2d 394, 402 (N.D.N.Y. 2004)
(awarding tuition reimbursement for child who was not evaluated after parent informed superintendent
of child's emotional difficulties and school psychologist recommended placement); Dep't of Educ. v.
Cari-Rae S., 158 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1200 (D. Haw. 2001) (finding state responsible for cost of
hospitalization for failure to refer and evaluate student earlier).
170 See, e.g., W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 500-02 (3d Cir. 1995) (upholding an action for
damages based on, among other things, defendant's failure to identify and evaluate a child with
disabilities in violation of regulations); Hicks v. Purchase Line Sch. Dist., 251 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1254-
55 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (finding sufficient evidence was presented from which a jury could believe
defendants failed to fulfill child find obligations, given child's academic and behavioral decline);
Wiesenberg v. Bd. of Educ., 181 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1312 (D. Utah 2002) (finding issues of fact whether
district was sufficiently on notice).
171 See M.S. v. Bd. of Educ., 231 F.3d 96, 101 (2d Cir. 2000) (highlighting that "an appropriate
private placement is not disqualified because it is a more restrictive environment than that of the public
placement [and] [t]hus, the test for the parents' private placement is that it is appropriate, and not that it
is perfect").
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placement must be an educational program that meets the child's
special needs.172 To qualify as appropriate, the parent-selected
unilateral placement need not employ certified special education
teachers or prepare an IEP.173 Least restrictive environment
("LRE") considerations may apply when assessing whether the
unilaterally selected placement is proper, but parents are not
held to the same strict standard as school districts in this
regard.174 Courts have determined, in essence, that LRE is one
among many factors considered in determining whether the
private placement is proper under the Act. When parents are
unable to place the child in the least restrictive environment they
are not necessarily barred from receiving a tuition
reimbursement award.175
C. Limitations on Reimbursement Based on Parental Conduct
IDEA/2004 confers on hearing officers and the courts discretion
to reduce or deny a reimbursement award when the parent fails
to give adequate notice to the LEA prior to the child's removal,
fails to make the child available for evaluation, or when the
parents' actions are unreasonable. Each of these is discussed in
turn.
i. Failure to Give Adequate Notice to the LEA Prior to the
Child's Removal
A parent's right to reimbursement may be reduced or denied if:
172 See MS., 231 F.3d at 104 (positing that "[o]nce it is established that a school district's IEP is
inappropriate, [the court] must consider whether the 'private education services obtained by the parents
were appropriate to the child's needs"').
173 See Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 14 (1993) (finding such
requirements inapplicable to private parental placements).
174 See MS., 231 F.3d at 105 (recognizing that "parents seeking an alternative placement may not
be subject to the same mainstreaming requirements as a school board" but that the mainstreaming
requirement "remains a consideration that bears upon a parent's choice of an alternative placement and
may be considered by the hearing officer in determining whether the placement was appropriate"); see
also Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E., 172 F.3d 238, 248 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that that parent was
not obligated to show that student was unable to be educated in a public setting in order to receive
reimbursement for a more restrictive private placement); see generally Warren G. v. Cumberland
County Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 80, 84 (3d Cir. 1999) (admonishing that the test for reimbursement is
appropriateness, not perfection).
175 See MS., 231 F.3d at 105 (agreeing with the District Court's finding that parents will not be
denied reimbursement simply because their unilateral placement did not result in the least restrictive
environment but overruling District Court's holding because the level of restrictiveness remains a
consideration that must bear on the parents' decision).
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(aa) at the most recent IEP meeting that the parents
attended prior to removal of the child from the public
school, the parents did not inform the IEP Team that
they were rejecting the placement proposed by the
public agency to provide a free appropriate public
education to their child, including stating their
concerns and their intent to enroll their child in a
private school at public expense; or (bb) 10 business
days (including any holidays that occur on a business
day) prior to the removal of the child from the public
school, the parents did not give written notice to the
public agency of the information described in item
(aa) [.]176
IDEA/2004, however, provides that notwithstanding these
notice requirements:
... the cost of reimbursement (I) shall not be
reduced or denied for failure to provide such notice if -
- (aa) the school prevented the parent from providing
such notice; (bb) the parents had not received notice,
pursuant to section 615, of the notice requirement in
clause (iii)(I); or (cc) compliance with clause (iii)(I)
would likely result in physical harm to the child; and
(II) may, in the discretion of a court or a hearing
officer, not be reduced or denied for failure to provide
such notice if - - (aa) the parent is illiterate or cannot
write in English; or (bb) compliance with clause (iii)(I)
would likely result in serious emotional harm to the
child.177
In Ms. M. ex rel. KM. v. Portland School Committee,178 the
court affirmed the district court's denial of reimbursement to the
parent for her child's placement at a private school.179 It was
undisputed that the parent failed to provide the requisite notice
at the most recent IEP meeting and 10 days prior to the child's
removal to the private school. The parent claimed, however, that
she fell into exceptions to this requirement based on her illiteracy
176 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(I) (2006).
177 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(I) 2006). Unlike its predecessors, IDEA/2004 adds the phrase,
"in the discretion of the court or hearing officer," thereby making a reduction or denial discretionary
rather than absolute. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997 §
612(a)(l 0)(C)(iv).
178 360 F.3d 267 (lst Cir. 2004).
179 See id. at 274.
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and the district's failure to provide the section 1415 notice of her
rights.18 0 The circuit court rejected the parent's assertion of
illiteracy and that she had not received the required notice of her
rights, finding the trial court's determinations on these issues
were not clearly erroneous.18 1 The court did not find an abuse of
discretion in the trial court's decision to deny reimbursement.18 2
Aside from the illiteracy and fair notice exceptions, a parent's
failure to give the required notice of removal will not necessarily
bar a claim for tuition reimbursement based on the so-called
dangerousness exception.183
ii. Failure to Make Child Available for Evaluation
Another ground for the denial or reduction of reimbursement
exists if:
prior to the parents' removal of the child from the
public school, the public agency informed the parents,
through the notice requirements described in section
615(b)(3), of its intent to evaluate the child (including
a statement of the purpose of the evaluation that was
appropriate and reasonable), but the parents [do] not
make the child available for such evaluation[.]184
Consequently, parents who do not make their child available
for evaluation upon receipt of a proper request from the district
and later seek reimbursement for a unilateral placement do so at
great financial risk.1s 5 However, the parents' failures to produce
180 See id. at 268.
181 See id. at 272-73. in reaching its determination, the First Circuit pointed out that the parent was
a high school graduate, the child's teachers had no indication the parent could not read, that the parent
had completed the written application to the private school and that she indicated on a kindergarten
questionnaire that she read stories to her child. Id. Respecting the notice of rights issue, the court found
the parent had received notice of her duty to inform the district of her intent to remove the child from
the public school. See id. at 272.
182 See Ms. M, 360 F.3d at 373.
183 See J.M. by A.S. v. Kingsway Reg'l Sch. Dist., No. 04-4046(RBK), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18110, at * 13 (D. N.J. Aug. 18, 2005) (noting that, notwithstanding the provisions under the IDEA
which will reduce or deny reimbursement for a unilateral placement where parents fail to give school
authorities proper notice of the placement, reimbursement may not be reduced or denied "where
compliance with the notice requirement 'would likely result in physical or serious emotional harm to
the child"').
184 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(1l) (2006).
185 See, e.g., P.S. v. Brookfield Bd. of Educ., 353 F. Supp. 2d 306, 315 (D. Conn. 2005) (stating
parents forfeited right to reimbursement by not consenting to psychological evaluation since they were
unable to demonstrate that evaluation would cause the student harm); D.P. by Pierce v. Sch. Dist. of
Poynette, No. 03-C-3 10-C, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4903, at *23 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 16, 2004) (denying
reimbursement where parents refused to allow the district to evaluate their son); Caitlin v. Rose Tree
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the child may be excused where the notice furnished by the
district was insufficient.
iii. Parental Actions Are Unreasonable
Finally, " . . . upon a judicial finding of unreasonableness with
respect to actions taken by the parents" the reimbursement
award may be denied or reduced.18 6 In Loren F. v. Atlanta
Independent School System,18 7 for example, the court remanded
the case to the trial judge who had dismissed the parents' claim
for reimbursement based on the parent's "unreasonable" conduct
without first making a FAPE determination. 188
The student in Loren F. had attended a private school for
seventh and eighth grades. Thereafter, the student's mother
completed an application for the private school that indicated she
would seek reimbursement from the district, before she contacted
the district about enrolling the student in the public school for
ninth grade. Before completing an evaluation, the district's IEP
team developed an interim IEP. The parents refused to give
written approval to the interim program believing the district
lacked the resources to teach their son. They withdrew Loren
from the public school after five days, placed him in the private
school, and then sought reimbursement. The Eleventh Circuit
held that the trial court's conclusion that the parents acted
unreasonably as a matter of law was error, since factual issues
surrounded the parents' conduct.' 8 9 On remand the court was
directed to conduct:
"...a bench trial on the entire IDEA case and to make
findings of fact and conclusions of law on each of the
issues in this case including, but not limited to: (1)
whether Loren was provided a FAPE; (2) whether [the
school district] complied with IDEA's procedures; (3)
whether the IEP developed through those procedures
was reasonably calculated to enable Loren to receive
educational benefits; (4) if Loren was not provided an
Media Sch. Dist., No. 03-CV-6051, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13102, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 2005)
(denying reimbursement where parent did not argue that the child's IEP was inappropriate or that their
placement in private school was appropriate).
186 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(l0)(C)(iii)(IlI) (2006).
187 349 F.3d 1309 (11 th Cir. 2003).
188 See id. at 1318 (explaining why the parents' acts were not unreasonable as a matter of law).
189 See id. at 1314-17 (discussing plaintiff's prior actions and the district court's ruling).
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appropriate FAPE or IEP, whether Loren's parents
contributed to, and to what extent, the failure to
provide Loren with an appropriate FAPE or IEP by
either being unavailable themselves or in not making
Loren more available to [the school district]; (5) did
Loren's parents act unreasonably under 20 U.S.C. §
1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(III); (6) when was Loren "removed"
for purposes of 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(I), from
public school under IDEA - - that is was Loren
removed from [the public school] when he stopped
attending [the public school] on 8/18/00, when his
mother sent a formal rejection of the IEP on 8/21/00,
when Loren actually enrolled in private school, or on
some other date; (7) whether the parents complied
with the notice requirement in 20 U.S.C. §
1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(I)(aa)-(bb); and (8) whether the safe
harbor provision in § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iv)(II) is
applicable to this case. 190
Needless to say, parental conduct which disrupts the
evaluation process or IEP meetings, especially where it interferes
with the development of a FAPE for a child, will be extremely
prejudicial to the parents in a reimbursement case. Moreover,
where parents are verbally abusive to school officials or withhold
information vital to a child's program development, their chance
for obtaining tuition reimbursement is markedly diminished.
Similarly, where parents refuse to attend IEP meetings in the
absence of a reasonable excuse, such conduct will diminish their
chance of success on a tuition reimbursement claim.
D. Other Limitations
For the first time, IDEA/2004 contains an express statute of
limitations. A party must request a hearing within two years of
the date the party knew or should have known about the alleged
action that forms the basis of the complaint.191 However, IDEA
defers to state law if the state has set a different time limitation
for requesting such a hearing.192 Under IDEA/2004, the new
limitations period does not apply to a parent if the parent was
prevented from requesting a hearing due to a specific
190 Id. at 1319.
191 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C) (2006).
192 Id.
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misrepresentation by the district that it had resolved the
problems forming the basis of the complaint, or when the district
withheld information from the parent that the IDEA required it
to provide. 193 IDEA/97 and its predecessors did not have such a
limitations period, leaving it to state law and judicial
interpretation to resolve the issue. 194
Although Carter specifically mentioned that the
reasonableness of the cost of a private school is a factor which
may limit a parent's recovery, very few school districts have
chosen to litigate that issue. In one case, however, the court
reduced the $480 daily rate for rehabilitation services, but
upheld the $275-per-day rate at another facility, basing its
analysis on the customary rates in the region and the degree of
expertise available at the facility. 195
E. Prior Receipt of Special Education as a Condition of Tuition
Reimbursement
Recent cases applying IDEA/97 have limited a parent's right to
tuition reimbursement to situations where the child has "...
previously received special education and related services under
the authority of a public agency. ... "196 There is no reason to
believe these courts would have decided the cases differently
under IDEAI2004 since the applicable language is identical. 197
In light of these decisions, appellate courts will have to
determine the circumstances that their broad authority, under
section 615(h)(2)(C)(iii), to grant "appropriate relief' is limited by
section 612(a)(10)(C)(ii)'s authorization to award reimbursement
193 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(D)(i)-(ii) (2006).
194 See Tex. Advocates Supporting Kids with Disabilities/Tex. Educ. Agency v. Tex. Educ.
Agency, 112 S.W.3d 234 (Tex. App. 3d Dist. 2003) (holding that Texas Education Agency one-year
limitation is applicable to administrative hearings under IDEA/97).
195 See River Forest Sch. Dist. v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., No. 95-C-5353, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5547, at *3-5 (N.D. I11. Apr. 24, 1996) (explaining the lower court's reasoning to uphold reimbursement
for rehabilitation services).
196 See Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of N.Y. v. Tom F. ex rel. Gilbert F., No.
OlCiv.6845(GBD), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2005); see also Carmel Cent.
Sch. Dist. v. V.P., 373 F. Supp. 2d 402, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (highlighting that "tuition reimbursement
is available only to parents of a child with a disability who enroll their child in private school without
the district's consent after the child previously received special education and related services under the
authority of a public agency"); but see E.W. and E.W. ex rel. J.W. v. Sch. Bd. of Miami Dade County
Fla., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1369 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (finding that "parents of a disabled student [are] not
barred from seeking reimbursement.., even though their child has never been enrolled in public
school").
197 See 20 U.S.C § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2006).
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to parents of students whose children "... previously received
special education and related services under the authority of a
public agency . . . ."198 Moreover, courts will have to reconcile the
case law granting parents reimbursement for unilateral
placements for child find failures against an absolute rule
denying reimbursement to parents based on a narrow application
of §612(a)(10)(C)(ii).
F. Reimbursement Resulting from Pendency Rights
Generally, courts have interpreted a child's "current
educational placement" as the current education, related services
and placement provided in accordance with the most recently
approved IEP.199 This means the IEP that was actually
implemented when the dispute arose. 200 By merely initiating
IDEA's complaint procedures, the parent can force the school
district to maintain the child in the last agreed-to program.
Questions are often raised as to what point, if at all, pendency
may change when parents initiate a complaint after they object
to their child's pendency placement or program proposed by the
district and unilaterally remove a child upon objecting. The
answer is found at 34 C.F.R. § 300.514(c)(1999), which states
that:
If the decision of a hearing officer in a due process
hearing conducted by the SEA or a State review
official in an administrative appeal agrees with the
child's parents that a change of placement is
appropriate, that placement must be treated as an
agreement between the State or local agency and the
parents for purposes of [the pendency provisions] of
this section.201
Thus, where a state level administrative order grants
reimbursement for a private school unilaterally selected by the
198 Id.
199 See Drinker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 78 F.3d 859, 867 (3d Cir. 1996) (defining the standard for
'current educational placement'); see also Thomas v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 918 F.2d 618, 626 (6th
Cir. 1990) (explaining that the location where the child receives instruction at the time of the dispute is
commonly "current educational placement").
200 Thomas, 918 F.2d at 625-26 (finding that the current educational placement centers around
where the dispute arose).
201 34 C.F.R. § 300.514(c) (1999).
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parents, that order changes the pendency placement from the
public to the private school, and obligates the district to continue
to fund the child's education at the private school until resolution
of the parents' claim. 202 This is because the school district's loss
at the state administrative level "constitutes a placement within
the meaning of the pendent placement provision of the IDEA".203
How, if at all, are parents' reimbursement claims effected by a
favorable, but untimely decision by state level review officers?
This question was resolved in Mackey ex rel. Thomas M. v. Board
of Education for the Arlington Central School District.204 In
Mackey, the Second Circuit held that the district is responsible
for payment of tuition as a result of pendency established at a
Tier II decision, retroactive to the date when the review officer
was required to make the decision, not months later when the
decision actually issued.205 The court held that a different
outcome would be "unfair to the parents." 206
Courts have consistently required school districts which lost
reimbursement cases at the state agency level to continue to fund
placements until IDEA's procedures are exhausted respecting the
then current or subsequent controversy. 207 Courts have further
held that, even when school district ultimately prevails, the
school district's obligation to fund the private placement during
202 See Bd. of Ed. of the Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Schutz, 290 F.3d 476, 485 (2d Cir. 2002),
cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1227 (2003) (holding that "a final administrative decision by a state review
board, agreeing with a parent's decision about their child's placement, constitutes a "placement" within
the meaning of the pendent placement provision of the IDEA").
203 See id.
204 386 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2004).
205 See id. at 165 (deciding that tuition reimbursement would be granted to parents as of date
Standard Review Officer's ("SRO") decision should have been made).
206 Id. at 164. The problem of untimely decisions by the State Review Officer ("SRO") of the New
York State Education Department was effectively resolved in Schmelzer v. N.Y., 363 F. Supp. 2d 453
(E.D.N.Y. 2003), where the court decided that the office is subject to a permanent injunction
compelling the SRO to timely decide Tier II appeals within the 30 day time frame required by federal
regulation. Id. at 460.
207 See Gabel ex rel. L.G. v. Bd. of Educ., 368 F. Supp. 2d. 313, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (obligating
district to pay child's tuition at private school because it was her pendency placement under settlement
agreement reached with district); see also Bd. of Educ. v. O'Shea, 353 F. Supp. 2d 449, 454 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) (finding that reviewing officer's decision, though issued more than one year after end of school
year in dispute, was retroactive to time preceding that decision for purposes of determining district's
obligation to pay tuition as pendency matter); see generally Spilsbury v. Dist. of Columbia, 307 F.
Supp. 2d 22, 27-28 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (directing district to reimburse parents' out-of-pocket costs for
educating their children with learning disabilities at private school).
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the pendency of a final judicial remedy is absolute and that
parents are not required to reimburse the school district.208
Since the applicable regulations treat the state level decision
as an agreement between the school district and the parents
respecting the private placement, it would seem doctrinally
unsound to require the parents to reimburse the school district
after an "agreement" was reached. Moreover, the threat of an
unjust enrichment claim may discourage parents from making
efforts to have their disabled children receive an appropriate
education.
Absent statutory changes, it appears unlikely that school
districts that ultimately prevail in reimbursement decisions will
be reimbursed the money they paid to the parents as a result of
their pendency obligation.
G. Reimbursement for Independent Educational Evaluations
IDEA/2004 § 615(b)(1) carries over from IDEA/97 the parents'
right to obtain an independent educational evaluation at public
expense, 209  when the parent disagrees with the district's
evaluation. 210 Under the procedural safeguards notice, school
districts are required to provide parents with a statement of this
right.211 When parents request an independent educational
evaluation, a school district must "without unnecessary delay"
file a due process complaint to establish that its evaluation is
appropriate or ensure that the independent evaluation is
provided at public expense unless the evaluation did not meet
208 See Lauren W. v. DeFlaminis, Civ No. 03-CV-1526, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18559, at *9-10
(E.D. Pa. July 20, 2005) (holding that district must pay tuition until close of litigation, and was barred
by stay-put provisions from seeking reimbursement for private school tuition during administrative and
judicial proceedings, even if district ultimately prevailed); see also Aaron M. v. Yomtoob, No. 00-C-
7732, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21252, at *20-22 (N.D. I11. Nov. 25, 2003) (explaining that parents who
received reimbursement as matter of pendency for twelve trips to visit their child with autism at out-of-
state residential facility were not required to reimburse the school district for trips in excess of six,
because to hold otherwise would cause parent who lacked sufficient financial resources to hesitate to
use stay-put protections).
209 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(a)(3) (2006) (providing that, "[i]ndependent educational evaluation
means an evaluation conducted by a qualified examiner who is not employed by the public agency
responsible for the education of the child in question," and clarifying that public expense requirement
means that, "the public agency either pays for the full cost of the evaluation or ensures that the
evaluation is otherwise provided at no cost to the parent...").
210 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(1) (2006) (highlighting parent's right to independent evaluation at
public expense if parent disagrees with public agency's evaluation).
211 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.503(b)(6) (2006) (requiring agency to alert parents of their procedural
right to obtain independent educational evaluation).
2006]
ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY
agency criteria. 2 12 The criteria established by the agency for
independent evaluations, "including the location of the
evaluation and the qualifications of the examiners must be the
same criteria as the agency employs when it initiates an
evaluation, to the extent that they are consistent with the
parent's right to an independent evaluation."2 13 Moreover, a
parent is not required to explain the reasons for requesting an
independent evaluation as a condition of obtaining such
evaluation. 214 However, the school district is not forbidden from
inquiring as to the reasons. 215 Regardless of whether the district
pays for the independent evaluation, its IEP team is required to
consider the evaluation in its decisions concerning provision of
FAPE to the child, if it meets district criteria for such
evaluations. 216  Any party is permitted to introduce the
independently obtained evaluation as evidence at a hearing on a
due process complaint regarding the child.217
If there is any one rule limiting a parent's right to an
independent evaluation, it is that such evaluations should not be
cumulative. 218 On a practical level, this means that absent
extraordinary circumstances, the parent cannot obtain at school
district expense multiple evaluations involving the same area of
212 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(2) (2006) (specifying that when parents file request for
independent educational evaluation, agency must either show why its own evaluation was appropriate,
or ensure that independent educational evaluation is provided at public expense, unless parent request
fails to meet agency criteria).
213 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(e) (2006).
214 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(4) (2006) (explaining that parent is not required to give explanation
for request for independent educational evaluation); see also Warren G. v. Cumberland County Sch.
Dist., 190 F.3d 80, 87 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding parents not obligated to express disagreement with
district's evaluation before requesting independent evaluation).
215 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(4) (2006) (clarifying that "agency may ask for the parent's reason
why he or she objects to the public evaluation").
216 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(c)(1) (2006) (explaining that when parent obtains independent
educational evaluation at private expense results must be considered if evaluation meets agency
criteria).
217 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(c)(2) (2006) (stating that privately obtained independent educational
evaluations "may be presented as evidence at a hearing ... regarding that child").
218 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. I11. Bd. of Educ., 41 F.3d 1162, 1169 (7th Cir. 1994) (upholding
reimbursement for one independent evaluation, but remanding to determine basis for order of
reimbursement for more than one independent evaluation); Bd. of Educ. v. I11. Bd. of Educ., 21 F. Supp.
2d 862, 880 (N.D. 111. 1998), rev'don other grounds, 207 F.3d 931 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531
U.S. 824 (2000) (limiting reimbursement to one evaluation, based on necessity, failure to cross-appeal
administrative decision); Hiller v. Bd. of Educ., 687 F. Supp. 735, 743 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (limiting
reimbursement to one evaluation).
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functioning for which an independent evaluation has already
been obtained.219
IV. PRACTICE CONSIDERATIONS AND COMMENTARY
A. When IEP Deficiencies Matter
i. Procedural Violations
Since parental participation is central to the purpose of the
Act, school districts which offer parents a "take it or leave it" date
for the IEP meeting, notwithstanding the fact that the parents
have expressed their unavailability on that date, or deny the
parents' reasonable request for an adjournment of the meeting,
are running a serious risk of loss on the procedural aspect of
FAPE if litigation ensues. 220
IEP meetings are, at times, adjourned at the school district's
request. Other times, the meeting commences and the school
district discontinues the meeting when the parties fail to reach a
consensus regarding the child's program. In any event, the
school district will often promise to reconvene the meeting.
However, it is not uncommon for the school to fail to reconvene
the meeting. Instead, parents are mailed an IEP containing
programs, services and/or goals which were never discussed at
any duly called and conducted IEP meeting. Obviously, such a
219 In the author's experience, school districts will generally agree to provide an independent
evaluation at district's expense, rather than initiating a due process hearing to establish the
appropriateness of its own evaluation(s). This makes sense when the cost of the two items is
compared. Moreover, it is not unusual that the results of the independent evaluation(s) are similar to
those obtained by the school district, especially on relatively stable measures like IQ and achievement
tests. Unfortunately, some school districts neither agree to furnish the independent evaluation nor
commence a due process hearing to establish the appropriateness of their own evaluations. Rather they
stand pat, assuming that if enough time goes by the parent will, so to speak, go away. This usually
occurs when the parents are relatively unsophisticated and unsure of their rights, or when there is a
history of a contentious relationship with the parents. In the author's experience once the parent serves a
demand for a due process hearing over this issue the district will comply will its obligations where it
has not done so before.
220 Parents of course should document in writing their requests for adjournment of IEP and other
meetings in the event a factual dispute later arises. However, parents and/or their representatives, should
not, of course, try to "game" the system by not showing up at IEP meetings, with the plan to later allege
they were not afforded an opportunity to participate in the process. Alternatively, school districts will be
well served by employees who develop paper trails evidencing multiple invitations to IEP meetings to
the parents, and send follow-up letters expressing concern about the parents' failure to appear at the
meeting.
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procedure thwarts the parents' participation in IEP development
and will be a per se violation.
Another significant procedural violation occurs when the
district fails to include appropriate educators at the IEP
meeting.221 When, for example, the child's current or future
teacher(s), either public or private, do not participate in the IEP
meeting, valuable information is lost from the planning
process. 222 Moreover, the absence of such teaching professionals
deprives the parent of an opportunity to learn how the child is
progressing in areas relevant to the child's needs. Further, it
may deny the child opportunities that would result from parent-
teacher interaction. The failure to include the child's educators
may prove fatal to the district's ability to defend a procedural
FAPE claim.223
Another procedural violation resulting in a denial of FAPE
stems from structural defects in the IEP. These include the
absence of, or incomplete evaluations of, the child, thereby
preventing an accurate assessment of the child's present levels of
221 Besides the parents, who are considered members of the IEP development team, section
614(d)(l)(B) of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004 mandates that
IEP teams include not less than one regular education teacher if the child is or may be participating in
the regular classroom environment and not less than one special education teacher. See 20 U.S.C. §
1414(d)(1)(B) (2006). Although the district enjoys discretion in the selection of which special education
teacher attends the meeting, the special education teacher should, to the extent possible, be the person
who is (or will be) responsible for implementing the child's IEP. Further, the IEP team must include a
district or other agency representative who is qualified to provide or supervise special education and is
knowledgeable about both the general curriculum and school district resources. See 20 U.S.C. §
1414(d)(1)(B)(iv) (2006). In addition to the foregoing persons, the IEP team must include an individual
who can interpret the instructional implications of the evaluation results. See 20 U.S.C. §
1414(d)(1)(B)(v) (2006). Further, besides these people, the school district and the parents are permitted
to bring to the meeting other individuals who have knowledge or special expertise regarding the child
and even, where appropriate, the student who is the subject of the meeting. See 20 U.S.C §
1414(d)(1)(B)(vi) (2006).
222 It should be obvious that if a school district is recommending an out-of-district placement for
the child, a representative of that placement should participate in the meeting. After all, the
representative would be the most knowledgeable as to whether the child's needs may be met at such
placement. Similarly, the teacher or teachers who worked with the child all year long and can offer
recommendations, based on objective and thoughtful analysis of the student's performance, are perhaps
in the best position to make program and service recommendations for the student. Unfortunately,
institutional inertia, resulting from budgetary constraints, fixed programming and self-imposed
scheduling limitations, among other things, may affect teachers' good faith recommendations from
being implemented.
223 IDEA/2004 loosens IEP meeting attendance requirements. Team members are not required to
attend in whole or in part, if the parent and district agree that the member's attendance is unnecessary
because his or her area of the curriculum or related services is not being modified or discussed in the
meeting. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(C)(i) (2006). Moreover, any IEP team member may be excused
from all or part of the IEP team meeting if the member submits to both the parent and the team written
input into the IEP's development prior to the meeting and the parent and district agree in writing to the
excusal. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(C)(ii) (2006).
REIMBURSEMENT TO PARENTS
performance in relevant areas. Since present levels of
performance are critical to developing goals for the ensuing
school year, school personnel should use reliable, valid and
relevant measures to ascertain present performance levels. This
will enable educators to assess the progress the child has made
on last year's goals and perhaps adjust the IEP for the ensuing
school year based upon the child's current needs. A related
problem is the absence of measurable annual goals which
correspond to the studont's needs. For example, it is common for
goals employed for one school year to simply be transferred to
another year without serious consideration of the child's progress
on those goals. It is astounding how often a school district will
repeat goals that the district claims the child has either attained
or did not make any progress, without examining the goals in
relation to the child's present performance. The child's
attainment of the goals would ordinarily require establishing
new goals which "raise the bar" in light of the child's
accomplishments. The absence of meaningful progress should
dictate re-examination and amendment of the child's goals and
perhaps the programs and services recommended.
A related problem arises where the district recognizes that
there are significant academic or social needs adversely affecting
the student's progress, but fails to provide an IEP that
establishes goals which address those needs. The IEP may only
provide for related services, say speech and language or
occupational therapy services, but fail to include goals for the
therapist to work toward. Such inadequacies may result in a
denial of FAPE. In sum, the IEP teams should objectively review
the child's current needs, establish goals toward which the child
is expected to progress, provide programs and services sufficient
to attain those goals and, at appropriate intervals, objectively
measure the child's progress toward those goals.
IDEA/2004 requires that IEPs state how the child's progress
toward meeting academic and functional goals will be measured
and the district must report that progress to parents. 224 Such
reports must usually issue concurrent with regular report
224 See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(l-I) (2006) (requiring notice to parent's of a child's
academic progress).
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cards. 225 The most significant deficiency in this aspect of IEP
development is the lack of objective measurement.
Unfortunately, it is very common for IEP teams to "measure"
progress based substantially on teachers' feelings about progress,
for example, teacher-made assessments. Although teacher-made
assessments can be helpful, they must be based on objective
criteria. Therefore, it would be far better practice if, for example,
such teachers were required to report starting points and ending
points in student's workbooks or textbooks between the start
date of school and the date of the report and include percentages
of success in each subdivision of the work the child produced.
Moreover, such reports should relate to the skills children are
expected to acquire in the general education curriculum and the
grade level with which those skills are associated. This will
assist the IEP team in its planning, including the establishment
of meaningful goals for the next ensuing school year based on
objective measures. Additionally, it will give the parents a
realistic picture of their child's strengths and weaknesses. This
will enable parents to advocate more effectively at IEP meetings
for needed special education and related services.
A new requirement in IDEA/2004 requires school districts to
provide special education and related services based on "peer-
reviewed research to the extent practicable."226 This will
presumably obligate IEP teams to keep current on methods and
techniques as reported in professional journals and other
sources. Their failure to use such research may become a
deficiency in IEP services resulting in a denial of FAPE.
It is not uncommon for IEPs to mention specific special
education and related services, but fail to include the frequency,
location or duration of those services. Further, the intensity of
the services or group size, for examples, are not always specified
in the IEP document, thereby raising ambiguities as to the exact
nature of the services the district is offering. These deficiencies
may also result in a FAPE denial.
225 See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(IIl) (2006) (referring to periodic reports concurrent with
traditional report cards).
226 See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(l)(A)(i)(IV) (2006). The full text of the subsection requires as part of
the progress report: "a statement of the special education and related services and supplementary aids
and services, based on peer-reviewed research to the extent practicable, to be provided to the child, or
on behalf of the child, and a statement of the program modifications or supports for school personnel
that will be provided for the child." Id.
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Another serious procedural deficiency worth mentioning is the
district's failure to deliver the IEP prior to the start of the school
year. In such cases it is not a matter of looking for deficiencies in
the IEP document, since there is no IEP in which to look. Absent
some special circumstance, this is a per se violation of FAPE.
This can fairly be characterized as either substantive or
procedural. If the IEP is eventually delivered it may provide a
substantive FAPE.
Sometimes the IEP contains statements as to what occurred at
the meeting, including specific recommendations for programs
and services that were made thereat and the parties disagree
over the accuracy of those statements. Unfortunately those
statements are sometimes inaccurate. For instance, the
document may refer to a parental refusal to permit evaluation of
the child when, in fact, the parent has executed consent for an
evaluation which is on file with the district's special education
office. Sometimes the IEP contains a comment that the parents
agree with the recommendation of the IEP team for programs
and services when, in fact, the parents expressly stated that they
disagreed with the recommendation or perhaps reserved
judgment for the purpose of consulting with experts to obtain
advice about the efficacy of the proposed program and services.
Therefore, the earlier the IEP document is delivered to the
parents the sooner the discrepancies can be resolved and the IEP
amended, if mutually agreeable. When the IEP arrives a few
days before school opens, it leaves the parents with little time to
negotiate with school officials, confer with their advisors and
perhaps resolve the dispute. Sometimes, based on their
dissatisfaction over what occurred at the most recent IEP
meeting, the parents will make a down payment to secure a place
for their child in a private school, still hoping to obtain an
adequate public placement for the child. The parents are in
essence hedging their bets. In situations where private school
programs fill up early and they do not have an IEP in hand,
parents are forced to make a decision about the public verses
private placement earlier than they would prefer. The late-
arriving IEP forces the parents' hand in the direction of a private
placement, simply because they had no choice. In short, the
better practice for school districts is to get the IEP to the parents
as soon as possible after the IEP meeting, perhaps at latest by
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the end of June. If not solving all problems, at least it will
resolve some of them.
ii. Substantive Violations
Substantive analyses require an examination of facts available
to the IEP team at the time the IEP was developed and a
determination as to whether the program offered was calculated
to provide the level of progress required under state law, so long
as the state standards do not fall below minimum federal
standards. Because determinations of substantive FAPE
violations are fact intensive and highly individual, it is
sometimes difficult to tell what violations, standing alone or in
the aggregate, will result in a FAPE violation upon judicial
review. Having said this, there are a few practical observations
that can be gleaned from the cases on substantive FAPE.
Certainly any analysis on substantive FAPE should include a
careful examination of the child's progress in any programs in
which he or she was recently enrolled. A one or two-year
retrospective is ordinarily sufficient. This would include report
cards, IEP progress reports, achievement and other testing by
general or special educators or related services providers, as well
as progress on behavior intervention plans, if applicable.
Independent educational evaluations obtained pursuant to
statutory entitlement and other testing performed by
professionals not employed by the school district should of course
be reviewed as well. The child's progress should be analyzed in
special education and related services programs the child has
received.227
When IEPs merely continue program and service
configurations which have consistently failed, the parents' case
that substantive FAPE has been denied will be strengthened. On
the other hand, where the child has made progress consistent
with the child's abilities under the existing programs and the
district intends to continue the child in an identical or very
similar program, it will be difficult to challenge the program on
substantive grounds. In such cases the parents should closely
227 When progress is measured by pre- and post-testing on standardized tests it is important that
the tests measure the same skills. For example, if the baseline measures are comprised of reading scores
on the Wechsler Individual Achievement Test (WIAT), the post-test progress measure should ordinarily
be the same or a parallel version of the WIAT. This is the so-called "apples to apples" comparison.
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examine the measurements the district employed in concluding
the child progressed adequately. However, even if on such
scrutiny the district produces meager objective evidence of
progress, the tribunal may credit teachers' mantra of "slow and
steady progress" and find that the program is adequate.
Sometimes a substantive FAPE violation can be established if
the teacher(s) or related services providers recommend, in
writing or otherwise, that the student receive services in addition
to or different from those included in the IEP. For example, it is
not uncommon for teachers to urge parents to hire a tutor for two
or three after-school sessions per week of private reading or other
academic supports to enable the student to keep up with his or
her current program. In such cases, a strong argument can be
made that the student needs those services as part of the IEP
since they enable the student to participate and advance in the
general education curriculum.
In a similar vein, psychological or speech and language reports,
for example, may contain express recommendations based on
needs assessments the evaluators performed, yet such services do
not appear on the IEP. Here, too, a strong argument may be
available that a substantive FAPE denial occurred. Although
such recommendations are not conclusive on the IEP team, they
may be persuasive before the relevant tribunal because such
service providers usually possess special expertise not possessed
by other IEP team members.
Problems of generalization of benefits across settings usually
involve children with more severe disabilities. It is quite natural
for parents whose children are burdened with extreme needs to
be conflicted about how much time should be devoted to
socialization versus academic goals. And even if there is
agreement on the appropriate proportion, there may be
disagreement on where progress should be shown. It is
submitted that in most cases it is irrational to limit social skills
development to a classroom only. Not only is such limitation
inconsistent with the structure of the statute, but with the
definition of what social skills are and, more broadly, what
constitutes an educational setting. Such statutory constructs as
vocational rehabilitation, vocational education, travel training,
and self-care skills, strongly implicate behaviors occurring
outside of the formal academic setting. Indeed, they are the sine
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qua non for any child to become a wholly or partially independent
adult and a functioning member of society. In short, the settings
for specific progression in these areas should be addressed in the
IEP and generalization should be planned for and expected.
Perhaps the best advice that can be given on substantive FAPE
is to examine the most recent decisions by the highest state
administrative tribunal and develop a grid on cases which
address the needs of children whose characteristics come closest
to the child you represent. Courts will give deference to state
administrative tribunals' view on the adequacy of educational
programming. Therefore, ascertaining what the standard of
review in your state is and how it is actually applied is critical in
analyzing the merits of your case. The reality is that in some
circuits, deference to state agency substantive FAPE
determinations can virtually preclude judicial review.
Perhaps the single most important questions will be how the
disability affects the child's capacity to participate and progress
meaningfully in the general education curriculum, that is, the
curriculum non-disabled children receive at their grade level and
what special education and related services are appropriate to
make that happen. If there is a material gap between the
program and services offered and the child's needs, there will a
substantive FAPE denial. In conducting this analysis, relevant
inquiries will include factors such as the frequency, duration and
intensity of the special education and related services the IEP
contains, the proposed class size(s) and the developmental levels
of the children with whom the child will be grouped. Disabled
students must be placed with children whose needs are similar
intellectually, socially, emotionally, physically and in terms of
management needs. Moreover, since programming must be
offered in the "least restrictive environment," that is, to the
extent appropriate with non-disabled children, it is imperative
that the child's advocate determine whether the IEP satisfies this
requirement. If the case hinges upon substantive FAPE and
least restrictive environment issues, there will be a strong
preference for mainstreaming unless there is a very good reason
to separate the child from his or her non-disabled peers. In this,
as well as other substantive areas, the importance of expert
testimony cannot be overstated. For example, if the child's IEP
assigns the child to a mainstream setting of the kind where he or
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she has progressed very little over the past two years and your
expert special educator testifies that the child requires a more
restrictive small class setting in order to progress, this
combination of educational history and expert opinion may be
difficult for the school district to overcome, notwithstanding LRE
principles. Of course, the benefits to the child of the more
restrictive setting should be particularized in terms of the child's
individual needs.
In sum, it is probably easier to establish a FAPE denial on
procedural rather than substantive grounds. However, the
advocate must become familiar with the child's substantive needs
and be prepared to show how they are not being met in the IEP.
Moreover, understanding the child's substantive needs is
necessary to demonstrate the adequacy of the private school
and/or other services unilaterally selected by the parents.
B. Selection of Proper Private Schools and Service Providers: A
Needs Driven Determination
It is clear under Carter that the private school selected by the
parents need not be approved by the state for educating special
needs children or employ state certified teachers, in order to be
proper for reimbursement purposes. 228 Moreover, parents may
obtain reimbursement even where the private school does not
provide an IEP for the child. It is submitted, nevertheless, that it
is easier for the parents to meet their burden of establishing the
propriety of the private school and other services if they present
evidence which shows that the service providers possess state
credentials in the disciplines in which they work, whether it be
special or general education, related services or subject matter
areas. Such credentials enhance the credibility of these
witnesses and the institution they serve.
Similarly, although the private school is not bound by state or
local curricula, the parents' case will be strengthened where such
curricula or other sequential teaching in each subject area is
offered at the private school and demonstrated to the tribunal.
State and local curricula have inherent credibility and their use
shows recognition that the child may someday return to the
228 See Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 14 (1993) (holding that a parent's
failure to choose a state approved school is not itself a bar to reimbursement).
2006]
ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY
public school. In that event the child will be able to transition to
the public program seamlessly since the child's curriculum
corresponds to that offered by the public school.
Similar principles apply to social, emotional, life skills and
vocational education areas. In every case, a thoughtful
sequential and developmental approach should obtain. Again,
this is not only sound pedagogically, but it goes to the credibility
of the institution and how it operates its programs.
A showing of how the unilaterally selected program and
services meets the child's needs is paramount to the parents'
case. It is imperative that the parents demonstrate how the
placement they selected overcomes IEP deficiencies, especially
where the parent has attacked the IEP on substantive FAPE
grounds. For example, if the parents contend that the child
cannot function in a class of more than six children and attack
the IEP based on the fact that the child was mainstreamed
within a class of twenty-five students with a resource room
program, the parents should put in evidence of the child's class
size at the private school and call witnesses who can explain why
the child needs such small classes, or at least why such a setting
is appropriate. If the private school exclusively educates children
with disabilities, the school district will unquestionably raise the
failure to educate the child in the least restrictive environment
as a fact that should defeat the parents' reimbursement claim.
These efforts by school districts usually fail. As stated,
unilaterally selected private schools are not required to provide a
FAPE like public schools. LRE is just one of many factors in
determining whether the private placement is proper. However,
the extent that the private school exposes its students to a non-
disabled student population should be brought out in the
hearing, notably where the private school involves the children in
community or recreation programs.
What if the parents have criticized the IEP for its absence of
language development goals and the private school does not
employ speech and language therapists, the related service
providers who usually work with children on such needs? How
then, can they demonstrate their unilateral placement addresses
those needs? There is no reason why language skills could not be
taught by a special or general educator at the private school, so
long as that service meets the child's needs. Additionally, there
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is no reason why the parent cannot supplement the private
school program with speech and language therapy and arrange
for the speech and language therapist to communicate with the
private school staff at appropriate intervals to insure integrated
efforts on behalf of the child. As another example, if the parents
contend the IEP lacks an adequate behavior management plan,
they should show how the management plan at the private school
meets needs which were overlooked in the IEP. The private
school need not be perfect, but it must address the child's
dominant needs.
As with the public program, the private school should keep
adequate records of the child's progress in text and workbooks as
well as in areas such as life skills, socialization, vocational
interests and needs and other relevant areas. Fact finding by the
tribunal is made easier by objective evidence. It helps avoid
credibility issues.
This all leads to the conclusion that parents who intend to
unilaterally place their disabled child in a private school and
seek tuition and other reimbursement through IDEA's complaint
procedures, should look before they leap. Advocates who advise
such parents would be well advised to analyze the child's current
needs across dimensions of intellectual, academic, social,
emotional, physical and management needs and compare them to
what the private school offers before they select a private school.
This will improve their chances of winning their case and
increase the likelihood that the child will progress in relevant
areas of need at the school they select. In this regard, the
parents should secure from the private school a commitment as
to what programs and services the school will provide the child.
The last thing the parents and child need are battles being
fought on two fronts.
C. Parental Conduct: The Golden Rule Still Matters
Parents should always be polite and cooperative and should
always listen carefully, even where parents perceive public school
officials as being insensitive or indifferent to their child's needs.
I have always advised parents that the more off base they
consider the school official, the more polite they should be.
School officials are often under enormous stress for a variety of
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reasons. Moreover, there are incompetent school officials.
Whatever the source of the difficulty, courtesy is contagious and
sometimes it helps parents get what they want. Even when it
does not, it will be difficult to later accuse the parent of behaving
badly in a manner that interfered with IEP development.
Consequently, parents should not provide a defense to the
adversary in a reimbursement case that is otherwise sound.
Listening can never hurt. There may be another viewpoint and
the parent may actually learn that the school district's proposal
has merit. Moreover, by listening and taking notes, many of the
erroneous statements school officials have made can be either
corrected and used to resolve the problem or if litigation ensues,
submitted as evidence at the hearing against the district.
Listening is truly a win-win.
Similarly, parents should cooperate in any way that will assist
school officials in developing an appropriate program for the
child. Parents who refuse to allow the child to be tested or
interviewed by school staff will almost always lose their case. 229
How can IEP teams be criticized for an inadequate IEP when
they were denied the opportunity to gather information with
which to do the job? It doesn't matter whether the parents like
or don't like the particular school official or whether they think
the person is professionally inadequate. The school is entitled to
pick its own evaluators. Sometimes, school districts will agree,
upon request, to select another evaluator employed by the
district when there is a particularly bad relationship between the
child or the parents and the evaluator and the parents explain
this fact.
Parents should also cooperate by visiting classrooms and/or
out-of-district schools recommended by the IEP team. Even
where the parents are highly skeptical about the merits of the
recommended program, they should visit it anyway. As with
listening, they may learn something and be pleasantly
surprised. Moreover, if they don't like what they see they can
take advantage of this opportunity by taking detailed notes on
the program and later using them as evidence at the hearing,
showing why a substantive FAPE denial occurred. School and
229 See 20 US.C. § 1414(a)(l)(A) (2006) (stating that an initial evaluation of each student must be
completed before special education services are provided).
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classroom visits show parental cooperation and open-
mindedness. They enhance the parents' credibility and
undermine attacks against the parents on equitable grounds.
At the risk of belaboring the obvious, parents should show up
to IEP meetings. Should they become unavailable, they should
request an adjournment in writing and maintain a copy of that
request. When they are uncomfortable with the proposed
program, they should tell school officials about their concerns at
the IEP meeting. Since they are usually not educators, their
objections need not be wrapped in educational jargon but should
be clear enough so that the essence of their concern is readily
apparent. Even if other deficiencies become obvious later, they
will not be precluded from alleging them by reason of their
failure to raise them at the meeting. They should, however,
assert those deficiencies in their due process complaint.
If the parents know at the IEP meeting they intend to look for
private programming they should indicate as much to the
district, even if the parent is not sure what the program will be.
Again the parents' message should be reiterated in a writing as
soon as may be practicable after the meeting to establish that the
communication was made. Additionally, the parent must inform
the district in writing at least 10 days prior to the formal removal
from the district if and when the parents intend to seek
reimbursement for the placement. 230
Because it is so easy to confuse and/or forget the sequence of
events and their details, parents and their advocates should
maintain an events log with the date, time, location, persons
participating in the transactions and make that record as events
unfold or very soon thereafter. The log will include written and
oral communications, including the substance of telephone
conversations, from school district officials and as well as notices
or requests made by the parents. Not only will this help prepare
witnesses for testimony but the logs themselves may be
admissible at the hearing since formal rules of evidence do not
apply.
What should parents do after they have behaved badly? My
answer is to "put the genie back in the bottle." For example,
230 See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(l0)(C)(iii)(I)(bb) (2006) (requiring parents to give written notice to
the district ten business days prior to removal of their child).
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when they have refused to sign consent for an evaluation of their
child they should write to school officials and provide that
consent as soon as possible. If they failed to show up at a
scheduled IEP meeting, they should write to school officials,
apologize if appropriate, ask them to reschedule the meeting and
then show up. If they were rude to school personnel they should
again say they are sorry, explain why they were upset and put
the IEP process back on course. When parents have not complied
with notice of removal requirements, they should cure the
deficiency to the extent that circumstances will allow. If possible,
parents should cure all these problems before they litigate.
Generally, the tribunal will understand that the parents were
confused or upset since the problem involves their child or that
they were merely ignorant of the required procedures. The
tribunal will be less understanding about inexcusable belligerent
behavior and unjustifiable and persistent refusals to allow access
to the child or by transparent efforts to play the system. Exercise
of a little humility goes a long way. Parental failures may result
in a denial or a reduction in the reimbursement award. In short,
parents should fix their conduct which may be construed against
them, as soon as possible.
D. Issue Selection/Drafting Complaint: Paring Down the Pile to
Make Your Point.
IDEA/2004 made some important amendments to the content
of the due process complaint and to procedures which ensue
thereafter. It mandates that the party filing the "complaint
notice" provide a copy to the other party and a copy forwarded to
the State Educational Agency. 231 At a minimum it must contain
the name of the child, the address of the child's residence and the
name of the school the child is attending.232 In the case of
homeless children or youth the complainant must provide
available contact information for the child or youth and the name
of the school the child is attending. 233 The complaint must
231 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(7)(A)(i) (2006) (affirming the duty of the parents to copy both the
school and appropriate state educational agency with the complaint notice).
232 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(7)(A)(ii)(l) (2006) (noting that the complaint must include the name
of the child, address of primary residence, and the name of the school the child is attending).
233 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(7)(A)(ii)(ll) (2006) (explaining the appropriate procedure if the child
is homeless).
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describe the nature of the problem relating to the proposed
initiation or change, including facts relating to such problem as
well as a proposed resolution of the problem to the extent known
and available to the party at the time of the complaint. 234 The
due process complaint notice is deemed sufficient unless the
party receiving it notifies the hearing officer and the other party,
in writing, that the receiving party believes the notice has not
met the requirements listed above. 235 The party making such
assertion must do so within fifteen days following its receiving
the complaint. 236 Within five days thereafter, the hearing officer
must decide whether the complaint notice meets these
requirements based on the face of the complaint and must
immediately notify the parties in writing of such
determination. 237
IDEA/2004 permits a party to amend its complaint notice in
two circumstances. First, if the other party consents to such
amendment in writing238 and, second, where the hearing officer
grants permission.239 Such permission may be granted no later
than five days before a due process hearing occurs. 240 A response
"specifically" addressing the issues raised in the complaint must
be sent to the complainant within ten days of its receipt. 241 A
party requesting the due process hearing is not permitted to
raise issues at the due process hearing that were not raised in
the due process complaint notice, unless the other party
agrees. 242 Significantly, there is nothing in IDEA/2004 that
"preclude[s] a parent from filing a separate due process
234 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(7)(A)(ii)(II, IV) (2006) (requiring a clear description of the nature of
the problem and any proposed resolutions).
235 See 20 U.S.C § 1415(c)(2)(A) (2006) (stating that a complaint is assumed sufficient unless
there is a challenge).
236 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c)(2)(C) (2006) (outlining time requirements for challenging the
sufficiency of a complaint).
237 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c)(2)(D) (2006) (specifying that a determination of sufficiency is made
by the hearings officer).
238 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c)(2)(E)(i)(I) (2006) (noting the first circumstance under which a party
may amend complaint notice).
239 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c)(2)(E)(i)(I1) (2006) (stating the second circumstance where amendment
is permitted).
240 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c)(2)(E)(ii) (2006) (clarifying the timeline during which a complaint may
be amended).
241 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c)(2)(B)(ii) (2006) (addressing the amount of time the non-complaining
party has to respond).
242 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(B) (2006) (specifying bars to raising additional issue at a due
process hearing).
2006]
ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY
complaint on an issue separate from a due process complaint
already filed."243 Finally, before a due process hearing may begin,
the district is required to convene a so-called "resolution session"
with the parents and relevant IEP team members who have
specific knowledge of the facts contained in the due process
complaint. 244 The purpose of the resolution session is to obviate
the need for a hearing. The resolution session is not required
where both the parents and the district agree in writing to waive
it or agree to use mediation in lieu thereof.245 Before parents
participate in resolution sessions, they should insist on a written
agreement stating that communications during the sessions may
not be used as evidence at the due process hearing or in any
judicial proceedings. Of course, if the resolution session results
in a settlement agreement and there are ambiguities in the
writing, oral statements made during the negotiation process
may be relevant to discerning the meaning of the agreement. If
the district refuses to enter into a confidentiality agreement, the
parents or their representative should be circumspect so that
their good faith efforts to settle the case are not later used
against them. In any event, where the resolution session results
in an agreement, that agreement should be in writing.
The due process procedures are new and therefore, absent case
law, their precise interpretation is not always readily apparent.
Clearly, when drafting the complaint, it will not be necessary to
include every offense, small and large, committed by the district.
The complaint notice should, however, explain in simple
language the factual underpinnings for procedural and
substantive FAPE violations. Put yourself in the position of the
person on the other side reading the complaint and make sure
that the violations alleged in the complaint are apparent. It's
243 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(o) (2006) (stating specifically "nothing in this section shall be construed
to preclude a parent from filing a separate due process complaint on an issue separate from a due
process complaint already filed").
244 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B) (2006). The resolution session must take place within 15 days of
the district's receiving notice of the parents' complaint; must include a representative from the district
who has decision making authority; may not include the district's attorney, unless the parents are
accompanied by an attorney; and the parents must be provided with an opportunity to discuss their
complaint and the facts that form its basis, and the district must be afforded the opportunity to resolve
it. Id.
245 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(I)(B)(i)(IV) (2006) (discussing options available to both parents and
the school district prior to a due process hearing, specifically a resolution session or mediation).
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okay to be slightly over broad, just don't overdo it. After all, only
meaningful violations may result in a win.
In terms of the private program and services for which
reimbursement is sought, the name of the private school program
should be mentioned as well as the related services the child is
receiving and what related services are being sought by the
parents. Further, the parents should explain why the private
school is proper in terms of meeting the child's needs, at least in
general terms. The same concept will apply to the purchase of
tutoring and other services.
Certainly, the complaint notice should explain what it is the
parents are demanding, that is, reimbursement of tuition, related
services expenses, transportation and other things. Be specific.
For example, if the parents want interest on the reimbursement
award, they should ask for it. Since the new rules appear to
prevent parents from recovering for things they didn't request,
perhaps it will be safer to be overinclusive in this respect.
Parents should take advantage of the opportunity to amend the
complaint if they overlooked an item. Although the amendment
must be made at least five days prior to the hearing, there is
nothing improper with requesting an adjournment for this
purpose. Moreover, most attorneys will consent to the
amendment if it does not prejudice their client or they believe the
request will in any case be granted. Even if that fails, the rules
expressly permit parents to file another complaint which
contains items not included in the initial complaint.24 6 If the
parents file a second complaint, there is nothing to prevent them
from asking the hearing officer assigned to the first complaint to
consolidate the second proceeding with the first and try the cases
together. Recognizing that the proposed solution may not be
known to the parent, it is both sensible and fair to provide the
parents with the opportunity to amend the complaint or file
another one. It is posited that the amendments will be liberally
granted as they should be. As long as the school district receives
adequate notice it will not be prejudiced by the amendment. 247
246 See 20 U.S.C. §1415(o) (2006) (granting parents the opportunity to file additional complaints
to introduce issues not previously addressed in prior complaints).
247 1 think the better practice will be to include in the initial complaint a specific request for
permission to amend the complaint in the event the hearing officer should for any reason find the
complaint insufficient. Moreover, as soon as the parents receive a copy of the school district's notice of
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E. Burden of Proof/Persuasion and Burden of Going Forward at
Due Process: Does It Matter?
Schaffer v. Weast,248 decided under IDEA/97, held that the
general default rule that the party seeking relief in an
administrative proceeding, must carry the burden of proof and
persuasion applied to the case before it in the absence of any
guidance on the issue from IDEA/97. In Weast, that burden
belonged to the parents since they sought relief from the school
district.249 The Supreme Court expressly left open the question
as to whether state law could assign the burden of proof or
persuasion in IDEA proceedings. 250 Moreover, the court
specifically exempted from its holding the question of who carried
the burden of going forward, that is, who puts in evidence in
what sequence. 251 Since IDEA leaves the development of IDEA
procedure to the state, it is posited that the better view is that,
unless IDEA/2004 is amended, the burden of proof and
persuasion in IDEA administrative hearings should be
established by state lawmakers. Certainly, by leaving such a
large void, it may inferred that Congress did not intend to do
otherwise. Although this will result in lack of uniformity from
state to state in determining who carries the burden of proof or
persuasion on specific issues, it has the advantage of enabling
parties to refer to state statutory and regulatory law, as well as
longstanding state administrative practices, in predicting trial
sequence and assignment of burdens. State legislatures are well
advised to fill this void until Congress provides guidance on these
issues.
Finally, as the Supreme Court in Weast recognized there are
few, if any, cases where the evidence is so perfectly balanced that
the assignment of burdens or proof and persuasion will
determine the outcome of the case. 252 The real issue is trial
insufficiency they should write to the hearing officer requesting the opportunity to cure any deficiencies
in their notice.
248 126 S. Ct. 528 (2005).
249 Schaffer, 126 S. Ct. at 537 (holding that "[t]he burden of proof in an administrative hearing
challenging an IEP is properly placed upon the party seeking relief [and] [iun this case, that party is
Brian, as represented by his parents").
250 Id. (declining to address the issue of the role of state law because no pertinent Maryland state
law existed).
251 Id. at 534 (noting that the burden of production was not in question).
252 Id. at 535 (referring to the perfect balance of evidence as "equipoise" and stating that very few
cases demonstrate this).
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sequence, the burden of production. Parents required to put on
their direct case first will have greater difficulty, especially
parents appearing pro se. From an efficiency perspective, it
makes far more sense for the school district to present its case
first. This will enable the district to explain why it contends it
offered a FAPE. Not only are school districts usually represented
by lawyers experienced in framing questions, but they have staffs
of special educators, psychologists, speech and language
therapists, and administrators, as well as psychiatrists and other
specialists on call who can testify as expert or fact witnesses on
behalf of the district and frame the case. Under IDEA/2004
districts will have the benefit of the parents' complaint notice
and, to the extent they deem appropriate, gear their
presentations to respond to the parents' allegations therein. In
reality, parents not only lack staffs of their own to call upon, but
often cannot afford to hire expert witnesses. When parents
cannot afford to hire experts they may have to use experts
employed at the private school, if available. Private school
employees may be willing to testify about the substantive
deficiencies in the IEP and why the program in which they work
meets the child's needs.
Even where parents cannot produce experts to attack the
substantive program offered by the public school district, all may
not be lost. In a proper case the hearing officer can selectively
subpoena, to testify, members of the public school
staff.253 Sometimes those subpoenaed are staff professionals who
are not afraid to testify against their employer. These are
usually, but not always, tenured staff members of long standing,
who have strong beliefs about the inadequacy of the program
being offered to the child. Though reluctant as witnesses, staff
professionals often have written reports that assist the parents
in establishing that the child's needs will not be met under the
proposed IEP. Through witnesses, subpoenas, cross-examination
and the submission of appropriate documents, parents may
effectively establish the inadequacy of the substantive program.
In certain instances, parents have even brought tape recordings
that effectively end the case for the district. In most states, tape
253 See Sherry v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep't, 479 F. Supp. 1328, 1337 (W.D.N.Y. 1979) (highlighting
that the hearing officer is authorized to issue subpoenas).
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recordings are admissible so long as the person who recorded the
conversation was a party to the conversation.254 In any case,
rules of evidence do not apply in these proceedings. 255 Use of
such devices, nevertheless, warrants careful consideration, since
no one from the district may ever trust the parents again and
may implicate difficult moral issues. However, in the rare
instance where the school official is habitually deceptive, extra-
ordinary efforts may be required. Obviously none of this
precludes the parents from using tape recordings made
conspicuously at IEP meetings with the knowledge of school
officials.
Finally, where the hearing officer directs a trial sequence
different than that required by state law, it may not result in a
reversal of the final determination. 256 Provided each party was
afforded an opportunity to present its case, including calling its
witnesses, cross-examining the other party's witnesses, and other
indicia of a fair hearing are present, it is unlikely than a reversal
on trial sequence will occur.
F. Pendency as a Litigation Tool
Once a child attains pendency in the parentally preferred
placement, assertion of pendency rights at the next due process
hearing over the next ensuing IEP will in effect operate as an
automatic injunction, compelling the district to continue paying
for the programs and services the child is receiving under
pendency. 257 Therefore, when parents win their reimbursement
case for the current school year, they may, as a practical matter,
receive tuition and other expenses paid for at least two years.
254 See, e.g., Gwinnett County Sch. Dist. v. J.B., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1272-73 (N.D. Ga. 2005)
(ordering parties to produce tape recordings and full transcripts of IEP meetings recorded prior to the
hearing).
255 See Lillbask v. Sergi, 117 F. Supp. 2d 182, 192 (D. Conn. 2000) (holding that under IDEA,
"[d]ue process does not require formal rules of evidence and procedure").
256 See, e.g., L.E. v. Ramsey Bd. of Educ., No. 05-1157, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 1582, at *7 (3d
Cir. Jan. 23, 2006) (noting that district court uses a modified version of de novo review when looking at
determinations made by a hearing officer under IDEA).
257 See, e.g., Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 328 n.10 (1988) (suggesting that maintenance of
placement provisions create a presumption of irreparable harm if placement is changed unilaterally by
the school district); Bd. of Educ. of Cmty. High Sch. Dist. No. 218 v. I11. State Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d
545, 549-50 (7th Cir. 1996) (affirming grant of preliminary injunction by district court compelling
district to maintain student in residential setting and asserting that traditional test for preliminary
injunction need not always be met); Drinker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 78 F.3d 859, 864 (3d Cir. 1996)
(holding that movants are entitled to injunctive relief without satisfying the usual prerequisites).
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Assume, for example, that the parents prevail before the Tier II
hearing officer for school year 2004-2005 and the district does not
seek judicial review of the Tier II order. Further assume that the
district offers an IEP for 2005-2006 in May 2005 and that the
parents reject the new IEP and then commence a due process
hearing , claiming a denial of FAPE and requesting tuition
reimbursement as a remedy. Under this scenario the district will
be forced to pay for the pendency placement by virtue of the
parents filing the complaint with the district, and insisting that
the district maintain the child's placement. This is not a matter
of merely flexing parental muscle. Frequently, the district will
offer a program the second time around that is no better that the
one it offered in the first instance. This is often the result of
limited program options in the district. At times, it is the result
of the fact that the out-of-district program offered is as
objectionable to the parents as the initial program. Moreover,
where the child is successful in the unilaterally selected
placement, often the child's first true success, the parent will
naturally be reluctant to substitute a successful experience for
one whose outcome is far less certain.
Experienced school district attorneys understand the effects of
pendency. Therefore, when they know they have a weak case,
they may offer, on behalf of their client, to pay for the current
placement on condition that the parents will not treat it as a
pendency placement. A parent's decision to reject such an offer
depends on many factors, including the benefits of the private
placement to the child, the strength of the parents'
reimbursement case and the financial means of the parents.
While private schools will sometimes permit parents to go on a
payment plan for tuition and other expenses, there comes a point
where the parents will be required to advance substantial sums.
Consequently, the parents' staying power will often drive these
decisions.
The payment of attorneys' fees is equally important in the
negotiation process. If the parents obtain a reimbursement
order, they will become the "prevailing" party and the district
will become obligated to pay the parents' attorneys' fees
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reasonably incurred. 258 When the district has a weak or even
marginal case, this factor creates enormous pressure on the
school district to settle quickly. Indeed, in cases where the
amount of tuition involved is relatively modest, it is very easy for
the attorneys' fees incurred by the parents to exceed the amount
of the tuition claim. If they lose the case it may be very difficult
for attorneys representing school districts to explain to their
clients how in, say a $ 20,000 tuition case, the district incurred in
excess of $ 20,000 in fees from their own attorneys. Moreover,
assuming in our example the parents incurred fees similar to
those incurred by the district, this would mean that the district
could end up paying $40,000 in fees plus the $20,000 in tuition.
For most school boards, it is extremely difficult to justify
spending $60,000 for a $20,000 tuition case except in the most
unusual of circumstances. This amount, of course, does not
include claims for interest and other costs. 259
Often, it is possible to negotiate multi-year agreements for the
private school placement, especially with very impaired children
whom the school district has difficulty placing. Multi-year
agreements have the advantage of offering the child a stable and
258 IDEA/2004, as did its predecessor, provides that in any action or proceeding brought pursuant
to 20 U.S.C. § 1415, the court in its discretion may award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs
to the prevailing party. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2006). IDEA/2004 provides for the first time that
the court in its discretion may grant an award of attorneys' fees to an SEA or LEA who is a prevailing
party "against the attorney of a parent who files a complaint or subsequent cause of action that is
frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, or against the attorney of a parent who continued to
litigate after the litigation clearly became frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation." 20 U.S.C. §
1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(II) (2006). In addition, IDEA/2004 permits courts to grant fees to prevailing SEAs and
LEAs against parents or their attorneys if the parents' "complaint or subsequent cause of action was
presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, to cause unnecessary delay, or to needlessly
increase the cost of litigation." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(III) (2006). Under IDEA/97 only parents
could recover attorneys' fees, even when the LEA or SEA claimed the parents acted in bad faith. See
Bd. of Educ. of Northfield Twp. High Schl. Dist. 225 v. Roy H., No. 93-C-3252, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 191, at *8-9 (N.D. I11. Jan. 12, 1995). Parents and their attorneys should not be intimidated by
school district attorneys' threats to use these provisions. Even when parents have marginally colorable
claims, I think it extremely unlikely that LEAs or SEAs will be successful in court in recovering fees
against the parents or their attorneys.
259 There is a split in the circuits as to whether prevailing parties may recover expert consulting
and witness fees as part of their costs in IDEA proceedings. The Seventh Circuit has concluded that
expert witness fees may not be recovered in IDEA proceedings. See T.D. v. LaGrange Sch. Dist. No.
102, 349 F.3d 469, 482 (7th Cir. 2003). The Eighth Circuit reached a similar holding. See Neosho R-V
Sch. Dist. v. Clark ex rel. Clark, 315 F.3d 1022, 1031 (8th Cir. 2003). The Third Circuit however has
reached a contrary determination. See Arons v. N.J. State Bd. of Educ., 842 F.2d 58, 62 (3d Cir. 1988).
Recently, the Second Circuit joined the Third and held that parents who prevail may recover expert
consulting fees as part of their costs. See Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 402 F.3d 332, 336 (2d
Cir. 2005). On January 6, 2006 the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of the availability
of an award for expert fees under § 1415(i)(3)(B), the fee-shifting provisions of IDEA. See Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 978 (No. 05-18).
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hopefully adequate education for a period of years. It is posited
that such arrangements are preferable. When agreements are
reached, it is recommended that an opt out provision be included
in the agreement. Since children change, the program which was
successful may become inappropriate, either because things got
better or worse, or for some other reason. The agreement should
provide for such a contingency. The contingency plan should
come in the form of an option for the parents to return to the IEP
team for an IEP recommendation based on the child's then
current condition or for the parent to make an alternative private
placement so long as the new placement does not exceed the cost
of the original deal. The alternatives that will be acceptable will,
of course, depend of the child and the parents' means and
negotiating power. 26 0
G. Further Legislative Reform
i. Burdens of Proof and Production
In light of Schaffer v. Weast, Congress would be well advised to
direct its attention to questions of burden of proof on distinct
issues, namely FAPE. For reasons discussed above, it makes
sense to place that burden on the school district or other agency.
Moreover, Congress should establish the order in which
testimony must be presented. Certainly school districts or other,
agencies should shoulder the responsibility of presenting their
case first. They possess the child's records and employ all, or
virtually all, of the professionals who recommended the
particular programs and services contained in the IEP.
Furthermore, Congress should assign burdens on the various
defenses to reimbursement claims listed in IDEA/2004. Since the
character of the defenses is essentially "affirmative," it appears
that Congress intended for the school district bear the burden of
proof on those items. However, the burden of proof should be
made explicit. Until all of this happens, state legislatures should
fill in the void. It seems clear that, absent Congressional
direction, it is within states' powers to make such decisions.
Since IDEA permits states to legislate over such matters, state
260 The art of negotiating a settlement agreement in reimbursement and IDEA cases generally
deserves an article in itself.
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enactments will in essence become federal law in the state of
enactment.
ii. Use of State Aid
Once parents prevail at the state level in an IDEA
administrative proceeding over their unilaterally selected
placement it should be required that the placement be state
aidable retroactive to the date of placement, due to the fact that
the state has, in essence, given its approval to the placement. 261
Since the aid would reduce the district's net cost for
reimbursement liability it would in a sense "reward" the district
for its mistakes. However, it would also make it easier to settle
cases once pendency has been established and very often would
be in the best interests of the child. After all, the purpose of the
Act is to help the child, not punish the school district. In any
event, state aid could be made available to districts in these
circumstances and they could, at their option, use it or elect to
litigate, if they found the private placement unacceptable.
Ideally, this would enable parents and districts to come to a
resolution sooner, putting their relationship back on the right
course. Additionally, subsequent litigation could be avoided.
Such legislation could be incorporated in a further amended
IDEA by mandating that states which accept federal IDEA
monies be required to fund private pendency placements in the
same proportion as it would a state approved placement of that
kind under state law, if made as a public placement. In the
meantime, state legislatures could pass laws having the same
effect.
iii. The Impecunious Parent
When FAPE has been denied to a parent that does not have
the means to pay for a private placement, tutoring and other
services during IDEA litigation, compensatory education may
provide a solution, though not a very satisfactory one. With
compensatory education, the child may receive an award of
261 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.514(c) (1999) (stating that "[i]f the decision of a hearing officer in a due
process hearing conducted by the SEA or a State review official in an administrative appeal agrees with
the child's parents that a change of placement is appropriate, that placement must be treated as an
agreement between the State or local agency and the parents for purposes of [the child's pendency
placement during IDEA proceedings)").
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services to compensate for what the child should have received in
the past. While seemingly sensible, the remedy may be
unsatisfactory because the child may be denied services at
developmentally critical periods.
It is posited that the better solution is an amendment to IDEA
that creates an administrative procedure similar to those used in
court for obtaining preliminary injunctive relief. The parent
would file a notice of complaint containing those items already
required by IDEA/2004. Accompanying the complain, there
would be an addendum requesting relief in the form of public
funding of the private placement as well as copies of documents
they intend to introduce at the hearing and a demand for
production of documents. Additionally, the parents would submit
a list of the witnesses then known to the parent whom the parent
might call to testify. The school district would be required to
supply the documents requested, subject to legitimate objections,
and any additional documents it intended to introduce as well as
a list of its witnesses within five days of receipt of the parents'
complaint. The hearing would commence not more than five
days thereafter. Since the right to this accelerated procedure
would be based on the parents' inability to fund a private
placement, the parents would have to demonstrate why their
financial circumstances prohibit their unilateral placement at
the school they selected. Upon the parent satisfying this
requirement, the hearing could go forward. Hearings would have
to be held on consecutive days until they are concluded. If the
parents obtained an order requiring the district to make the
payments, the district would be required to do so forthwith.
Although the district could appeal the payment order, the
required payments could not be stayed pending the outcome of a
final appeal, administrative or judicial. Of course the parent
would not be required to post a bond to obtain this relief.
This or a similar procedure would enable parents to obtain for
their disabled children an adequate education when it would not
otherwise be available to them. Although hearing officers
currently have broad authority to provide equitable relief, it is
uncertain whether their powers include ordering prospective
payments for unapproved private placements or services.
IDEA/2004, after all, only addresses the reimbursement remedy
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for private placements [not prospective payment obligations,
unless pendency rights are involved] 262
iv. IEPs: 60 Days in Advance of Their Implementation Date
Because of the problems associated with IEPs delivered
just prior to the commencement of a school year, it is suggested
that IDEA be amended to require IEPs to be delivered 60 days
prior to the period when implementation commences. Thus, if
the IEP team contemplates implementing the student's programs
and services on or about September 1, the IEP would have to be
delivered to the parents on or about July 1. This would give the
parties sufficient time to work out their differences, if possible. If
not, it would provide parents with sufficient lead time to locate a
private school and arrange for tutorials and other supports for
the child prior to the commencement of the school year. Since
the welfare of the child is the ultimate concern, the open window
would enable parents and private service providers and the
public schools to arrange for a mutually supportive and
coordinated effort that is sound pedagogically and efficient,
regardless of whether litigation ensued. Moreover, by requiring
IEP teams to deliver IEPs well in advance of the start of the
school year, school districts would be less likely to run into the
problem of not having an IEP in place when school begins. This
would reduce the school district's chances of failing the FAPE
test for want of a timely IEP.
v. Curriculum-based IEPs
Although IDEA/2004, like IDEA/97, frequently refers to
"general education curriculum,"263 IEP goals, in reality, are not
262 The Third Circuit has recognized that denial of meaningful access to appropriate programs and
services based on the parents means is inherently unfair and inconsistent with the IDEA's purpose, that
is, to serve all eligible children. See Susquenita Schl. Dist. v. Raelee S., 96 F.3d 78, 86-87 (3d Cir.
1996); see also Komninos v. Upper Saddle River Bd. of Educ. 13 F.3d 775, 780 (3d Cir. 1994). For an
interesting application of this principle where the district conceded it failed to offer a FAPE, and the
appropriateness of the unapproved private school selected by the parents, see Cornors v. Mills, 34 F.
Supp. 2d 795, 802-06 (N.D.N.Y. 1998). In Schl. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ. of Mass., 471
U.S. 359 (1985), a reimbursement case, the Supreme Court stated that, in a proper case, "'appropriate'
relief would include a prospective injunction directing the school officials to develop and implement at
public expense an IEP placing the child in a private school." See id. at 370. This implicates clearly a
remedy beyond reimbursement, at least in a case where, as there, administrative remedies were
exhausted. It does at least suggest, however, that a prospective injunction might be appropriate relief
where parents are without the means to make a private placement and they make a sufficient
preliminary showing that the child has been denied a FAPE.
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anchored to specific parts of the curriculum, assuming the
curriculum exists at all. When the word "curriculum" is used in
this article, it refers to a specific and detailed description of the
skills children are required to acquire at each grade level, in
every subject, organized sequentially and developmentally. More
often than not, it is very difficult for parents, and even educators,
who read IEP progress reports and report cards to determine
what they mean. This problem derives from the generality of the
statements which are made. If, however, each academic goal in
the IEP were tied to a specified segment of the curriculum and
those items were contained in a commonly accessible curriculum
manual given to or made available to the parents, then the
child's success or lack thereof could more readily be understood.
Moreover, if a dispute arises, for example, a disagreement as to
whether the child accomplished his goals by year's end, the proof
would be easily accessible, leading to an expedient determination
as to whether the child attained the particular goal. This would
enable participants in the IEP process to ascertain present levels
of performance and plan intelligently for the next year's goals.
Similar hierarchies can be made for vocational and pre-
vocational skills, speech and language and all other programs
and services the child receives. It should be emphasized that
curriculum-based goals are not the same as using standardized
tests and comparing pre and post-test results to determine
progress. While normative tests have their place, they typically
compare the child's performance in selected areas compared to
other children in the same age and peer-group. While normative
tests may point to areas of difficulty, they are usually not
anchored to a particular curriculum and do not, in a specific
curriculum-based way, tell us what to teach. Consequently, this
approach will lead to a common understanding about what
progress actually means and provide for greater accountability.
Congress should require this as part of the IEP process. While
it will not be necessary for Congress to usurp states in
establishing what the components of the SEA or LEA curriculum
are, Congress should require, at the very least, that each LEA or
SEA has curriculum manuals or similar documents to which IEP
goals can be anchored for every grade level in each area for which
263 See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 141 l(e)(2)(C)(v) (2006); 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2006).
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special needs programming occurs, and to the general education
curriculum. This is something that SEAs and LEAS should
already be doing. Unfortunately, such curricula often do not
exist. Of all the recommendations made in this article, it is the
most important.
CONCLUSION
I once had a psychology professor who taught a class in the
philosophy of science who gave the class an assignment, with the
following quote: "In order to know what you're talking about you
have to know whether you're talking about anything at all.
Questions as to whether it's worth saying come later." Our job
was to figure out what it meant and write a paper about it. By
the end of the semester the common consensus was that it meant
that in gaining what purports to be knowledge, reliability of
measurement is paramount. Without being able to derive stable
measures of what we see and develop tools to address the
problem based on those measures, we will fail, or at least not
know whether we succeeded. This principle applies with equal
force to learning what children know. Without ascertaining that
information in a reliable way, through mutually understood
observations, then what we write may not mean anything at all,
and that would be shameful.
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